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ANTI-JUSTICE
MELANIE D. WILSON *
This Article contends that, despite their unique, ethical duty to
“seek justice,” prosecutors regularly fail to fulfill this ethical norm
when removed from the traditional, adversarial courtroom setting.
Examples abound. For instance, in 2013, Edward Snowden leaked
classified information revealing a government-operated surveillance
program known as PRISM. That program allows the federal
government to collect metadata from phone companies and email
accounts and to monitor phone conversations. Until recently,
prosecutors relied on some of this covertly acquired intelligence to
build criminal cases against American citizens without informing the
accused. In failing to notify defendants, prosecutors violated the
explicit statutory directives in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA). In ignoring the statute, they also breached their
obligation to “seek justice.” No one complained about the prosecutors’
misdeeds because only prosecutors knew that the investigative
evidence had been concealed from defendants. In every FISA case,
prosecutors alone enjoy access to the relevant surveillance
information and singularly decide whether to withhold or disclose it.
Such ethical breaches are prevalent in plea bargaining and “Brady”
evidence situations as well. This Article contends that because of the
non-adversarial and secluded, or as I coin it “anti-justice,”
environment for moral decision-making in the FISA and other
contexts, these ethical violations are predictable, if not inevitable. The
review of case files for FISA evidence, like other, analogous, settings
in which prosecutors make decisions in seclusion, does not create the
milieu where the ethic of doing justice can flourish or, arguably,
survive. Doing justice in our system, this Article concludes, requires
adversarial judicial proceedings or some equivalent outside influence
as a check on prosecutors’ power and discretion. Criminal justice
scholars and defense lawyers have previously criticized plea
bargaining and prosecutors’ handling of Brady evidence. This is the
first Article to examine prosecutors’ recent defiance of FISA as proof
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that in each of these settings, justice demands capable adversarial,
judicial, or public influences.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors bear a unique professional responsibility to seek
justice. 1 Yet, our current criminal justice system too often places
them in environments in which this seeking-justice norm is bound to
wither for lack of adversarial judicial proceedings—the native soil
for the duty of justice. For instance, despite explicit statutory
directives in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 2
prosecutors have historically failed to notify criminal defendants
when the government relied on covertly acquired electronic
surveillance 3 in building a criminal case against the accused.4 In
May 2013, describing such notice as “unwarranted and
unprecedented,” federal prosecutors in Florida denied any duty to
disclose such information in a prosecution charging two brothers
with conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction and providing

1. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b)
(1993) (“The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of
the court . . . .”) and § 3-1.2(c) (1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice,
not merely to convict.”); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
(noting that the prosecutor’s interest should not be only in winning but that “justice
shall be done”).
2. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1812 (2010) (governing the electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence information); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2010) (declaring that
“[w]henever the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use . . .
against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic
surveillance of that aggrieved person . . . the Government shall . . . notify the
aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which the information is to be
disclosed or used . . . .”). In 2008, Congress enacted the FISA amendments Act, which
“left much of FISA intact, but it ‘established a new and independent source of
intelligence collection authority, beyond that granted in traditional FISA.’” Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013) (citing D. KRIS & J. WILSON,
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 9:11, at 349–50 (2d ed.
2012)); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
3. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2010) (defining “electronic surveillance” to
include “the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire or radio and other communication . . . in which a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy . . .”).
4. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2010) (requiring notice to the target of electronic
surveillance when the government decides to use evidence obtained by the
surveillance “in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States . . . .”); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (2010) (defining “aggrieved person” for
purposes of deciding who can object to the use of the surveillance evidence); 50
U.S.C. § 1806(d) (2010) (providing a similar process for the use by state governments
of evidence derived from electronic surveillance).
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material support to terrorists. 5 In Chicago, the story is similar.
Prosecutors contended they had no obligation to reveal whether the
investigation of an American teenager charged with attempting to
detonate a bomb outside a Chicago bar was prompted by a
government surveillance program. 6
Prosecutors have also repeatedly breached the duty to seek
justice by denying to the accused evidence favorable on the issue of
innocence, commonly called “Brady” evidence. 7 The case of former
Senator Ted Stevens serves as a high-profile example. 8 In April
2009, newly confirmed U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
announced that he would move to dismiss the jury conviction of the
Senator because of prosecutors’ failures to provide the defense with
Brady material before or during trial. 9 The prosecutors who tried the

5. Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spy Program Lifts Veil in Court, WALL ST. J., Jul. 31,
2013, at A1. The defendants in the Florida case are brothers, Raees Alam Qazi and
Sheheryar Alam Qazi. Two months after prosecutors refused to consider producing
information as required by FISA, the Department of Justice changed positions. “The
Justice Department acknowledged for the first time in a terrorism prosecution that it
needs to tell defendants when sweeping government surveillance is used to build a
criminal case against them.” Id.
6. Jason Meisner, Lawyer in Bar Bomb Plot Wants Info on Federal
Surveillance Program, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2014, available at http://articles.chicagot
ribune.com/2014-01-03/news/chi-adel-daoud-nsa-surveillance-request-20140103_1_ad
el-downtown-chicago-bar-search-warrants (reporting the defense lawyer’s request
that the presiding judge order prosecutors to “reveal whether the investigation was
sparked by a massive government surveillance program.”); see also Paula McMahon,
Bank Robbery Suspect Wants NSA Phone Records for His Defense, SUN SENTINEL,
June 12, 2013, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-06-12/news/fl-pho
ne-records-fisa-broward-20130612_1_nsa-phone-records-bank-robbery-suspect-cellph
one-records (documenting judge giving prosecutors additional time to respond to a
request by the defense for phone records gathered by the National Security Agency
after prosecutor said that “security procedures” would need to be followed before the
prosecution could respond). But see United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 622 (6th
Cir. 2005) (giving notice of an intent to use FISA information, including “audio tapes
of phone conversations and two faxes,” pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1801–1812 (2010)).
7. As explained more below, the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963), held that a prosecutor must give the accused access to
evidence favorable and material to the accused’s guilt or punishment. Thus, before
trial, a prosecutor is legally obligated to search the government’s files for “Brady”
materials.
8. See Nina Totenberg, Justice Department Seeks to Void Stevens’ Conviction,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story.php
?storyid=102589818.
9. Id.
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case concealed from the defense “notes from a 2008 interview,”
raising significant questions about Senator Stevens’ guilt.10
Cultural norms and rules of professional responsibility establish
behavioral parameters for all practicing lawyers. For most, this
guidance manifests in a singular focus on their client’s goals and
interests. But prosecutors are different; their professional
obligations are more complex. Unlike civil litigators and criminal
defense attorneys, who owe a duty of “complete loyalty to the client
and his cause,” 11 prosecutors are tasked with a responsibility of
general virtue and evenhandedness, commonly known as a duty to
“do justice.” 12 Prosecutors must zealously advocate for their
governmental client, while simultaneously looking beyond the
government’s objectives to “do the right thing,” writ large. 13
Although this duty of “justice” is inherently imprecise, 14 in several
contexts prosecutors effectively fulfill both directives. For example,
in charging, 15 trial,16 and sentencing, 17 the admonition to seek

10. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2009, at A1.
11. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 50 (Mo. 1976) (discussing the
difference between a “public” and “private” prosecutor and referencing the Missouri
Code of Professional Responsibility, which outlines the different obligations for each);
Ford v. State, 628 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Ark. App. 1982) (acknowledging that “[t]he
relationship between the prosecutor, his deputies, and the State, their sole client, is
fundamentally different from that which exists between law firms and the ordinary
attorney-client relationship.”). Charles Fried argued that the difference between the
government lawyer and the private attorney is the “complicated and elusive” nature
of the client. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1076 (1976). According to Fried, the
government lawyer’s client “might be thought to be the government of the United
States, or the people of the United States, mediated by an intricate political and
institutional framework.” Id.
12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
13. See supra notes 1 and 11 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1998) (describing the federal prosecutor’s duty of
justice as “protean as well as vague.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48
(1991) (indicating that the “‘do justice’ standard . . . establishes no identifiable norm”
and that “vagueness leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality
to determine just conduct”).
15. “Prosecutors do not charge in a vacuum; they do so against the backdrop of
trial. Because defendants always have the option of forcing a trial, prosecutors have
a strong incentive not to press charges in cases that cannot be won.” Robert E. Scott
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1933 (1992).
In the federal system, prosecutors’ unbridled discretion in what and whether to
charge is also guided by Attorney General directives. See, e.g., U.S. Att’y Gen. John
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justice works satisfactorily 18 because the prosecutor’s role is defined
adequately and her power constrained sufficiently by outside
scrutiny, such as grand jurors, petit jurors, probation officers, judges
and public opinion. 19 The prosecutor in these situations is not free

Ashcroft, Memo Regarding Policy On Charging Of Criminal Defendants, DEP’T OF
JUST. (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_
ag_516.htm [hereinafter “Ashcroft Memo”] (declaring that “federal prosecutors must
charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are
supported by the facts of the case [. . .].”); U.S. Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Memo to All
Fed. Prosecutors: Dep’t Policy on Charging and Sentencing, DEP’T OF JUST. (May 19,
2010), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/holder-charging-memo.pdf
[hereinafter “Holder Memo”] (qualifying the Ashcroft directive and explaining that
the determination of what charge to levy “must always be made in the context of ‘an
individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific
circumstances of the case . . . .’”).
16. When a case advances beyond the plea bargaining stage, a judge evaluates
the evidence and controls how witnesses are examined, resolves arguments of foul
play by the prosecutor, and is available to assist when the defendant alleges that the
prosecutor has withheld Brady materials. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 10 (reporting
that the Department of Justice planned to drop all charges against former Senator
Ted Stevens following the Department’s discovery that prosecutors concealed from
the defense “notes from a 2008 interview,” raising significant questions about
Senator Stevens’ guilt); United States v. Rigas, 779 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413 (M.D. Pa.
2011) (granting pretrial the defendant’s motion for the production of interview notes
pursuant to Brady despite prosecution’s refusal and objection to provide them);
Howard v. State, 403 S.W.3d 38, 42–48 (Ark. 2012) (finding that prosecution violated
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963), in failing to produce notes from an expert
who testified about DNA evidence linking defendant to the crime because notes
indicated potential errors in the DNA testing).
17. At sentencing, not only does the judge preside and evaluate the defendant
and the case independently of the prosecutor, in many systems (including the federal
system), a separate probation office investigates the defendant’s criminal history and
personal circumstances, reviews all of the known facts of the case, and prepares an
elaborate report for the judge, who then selects an appropriate sentence tailored to
the defendant. The probation officer’s preparation of a pre-sentence report also
provides an independent view of the situation, adding another level of review to the
prosecutor’s sentencing arguments.
18. This is not to say that the system works flawlessly. For instance, if defense
counsel is inadequately prepared for trial or otherwise engages in ineffective
assistance of counsel, the trial process may result in an unjust outcome. See
generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007) (noting various abuses of prosecutorial discretion and the ways
in which legislatures have limited judicial oversight of prosecutors thereby
increasing the power of prosecutors).
19. See Zacharias, supra note 14 (discussing the prosecutor’s duty of justice in
the trial context). At trial, the jury and judge constrain the prosecutor’s discretion.
When charging, the grand jury constrains the prosecutor’s power. At sentencing, the
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merely to advance bureaucratic goals—such as efficiency or
maximizing the number of convictions—at the expense of the
people’s larger interests. Nor is the prosecutor permitted to ignore
congressionally determined minimums designed to protect the
accused during proceedings, such as sentencing goals and
corresponding guidelines. These trial and hearing contexts involve a
degree of transparency that encourages prosecutors to share
information relevant to a judge’s or jury’s ability to make an
educated and equitable decision on the merits, and these same
external forces urge prosecutors to account for multiple interests,
including procedural and substantive fairness and public confidence
in our system of justice. Such external checks foster a prosecutor’s
ability to serve the interests of both the government and the people,
and thereby “do justice” even when there is uncertainty about the
most just course of action. 20
The same is not true when prosecutors pursue a case in which
the government intends to use evidence derived from secret
electronic surveillance. 21 FISA permits the President 22 to authorize
electronic surveillance of foreign powers without a court order. 23
Although Congress adopted FISA in 1978,24 prosecutors have only
recently faced public pressure to comply with Section 1806(c), 25 the
provision requiring prosecutors to notify the target of electronic

probation office will expose a prosecutor who strays from the facts or applicable
sentencing guidelines.
20. Professor Bruce Green contends that in the trial context, prosecutors and
defense lawyers “play by essentially the same rules.” Green, supra note 14 at n.114
(noting an exception for prosecutors because they “have authority to seek immunity
for witnesses” and an exception for the defense because they control “the testimony of
the most important witness—the defendant.”).
21. See Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 7, 2013, at A3 (describing an internal DOJ debate about whether to
disclose to the accused evidence resulting from FISA).
22. The President acts through the U.S. Attorney General. The FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 also permits the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to jointly authorize foreign surveillance. 50 U.S.C. §1881(a)
(2010).
23. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2010) (“The President, through the Attorney
General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this
subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one
year . . . .”); see also supra note 22.
24. See 50 U.S.C. § 36 (1978) (authorizing the government to conduct electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2010) (requiring the government to notify aggrieved
persons when it intends to use the information in court); id., supra note 4 (see
comment above).
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surveillance when the government has acquired and intends to use
the covertly acquired information. 26 This pressure mounted after
Edward Snowden disclosed classified information in 2013, revealing
that the National Security Agency (NSA) was secretly monitoring
and collecting data about calls and Internet activities both within
and outside the United States. 27 This data includes information
about communications by and between American citizens within the
U.S. 28 Given that the government singularly knows whether FISA
evidence of this type exists, there is an absence of justice-enhancing
transparency influences when prosecutors decide whether to disclose
information pursuant to FISA’s Section 1806(c).
Because little is known about prosecutors’ handling of FISA
surveillance information, the more common prosecutorial practices
of plea bargaining and prosecutors’ evaluation of cases for Brady 29
evidence are fertile grounds to expose the substantial disincentives
for prosecutors to accomplish justice in the FISA context. As with
FISA, plea bargaining takes place with little oversight from judges,
juries, and the public. 30 Plea outcomes are gauged not on whether
justice was done,31 but in terms of savings in court hours, reductions
in caseloads, increases in docket control, and by whether the case

26. Id.
27. See Savage, supra note 21.
28. Matt Sledge, A Secret Court Judge Warned the NSA It Was Close to
Breaking the Law — Then Gave It More Power, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20,
2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/20/nsa-fisa-court-opinion
_n_4311787.html (citing FISA Court Presiding Judge John Bates as noting that the
NSA’s gathering of metadata constituted “a ‘systemic overcollection’ of Americans’
information[,]” that was “so descriptive that it bordered on exposing the contents of
Americans’ communications.”).
29. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963); see also supra text
accompanying note 7; discussion infra Part III.B; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
437–39 (1995) (explaining that the prosecutor violates due process when she
withholds evidence that would have made a different outcome reasonably probable).
30. “As a process, plea bargaining lacks many of the building blocks of
adversarial theory, including the presence of neutral and passive decision makers
and rules that govern the evidentiary and arbitration process.” Fred C. Zacharias,
Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1139 (1998). “Insofar as
criminal trials serve to illuminate wrongdoing by the police, prosecutor, or some
other agency of government, accepting plea bargains serves to cover up the
misconduct.” Id. at 1178.
31. As explained more in Part III.A., the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), illustrates the emphasis on outcome over process.
The Court there ruled that a prosecutor is under no legal obligation to provide a
defendant with materially exculpatory evidence before the accused enters a guilty
plea. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
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ended in conviction—regardless of whether the crime of conviction
matches the offense charged. In every deal, regardless of what
fairness might suggest, the bargaining process presses prosecutors
to cajole defendants into relinquishing their right to discovery—
including the right to receive exculpatory and material
information 32—to forego the right to file a suppression motion
challenging evidence or statements as unconstitutional, to waive
their rights to appeal a sentence following the entry of the plea, and
to surrender their rights to challenge the plea or sentence
collaterally for any reason, including for their lawyer’s ineffective
assistance in negotiating the plea deal.33 Indeed, the primary and
sometimes overwhelming influence on prosecutors during plea
bargaining rests with supervisory attorneys, who may exert
substantial pressure on junior prosecutors to obtain a conviction and
reduce the number of pending motions and cases in the office. 34
Prosecutors also face significant ethical conflicts in the Brady
context. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor violates the due process rights of an accused when she
denies the accused access to evidence favorable and material to
either his guilt or his punishment, notwithstanding the prosecution’s
motives in failing to produce the information. 35 At a minimum, the

32. Before the Supreme Court decided Ruiz, which held that the U.S.
Constitution does not require pre-guilty-plea disclosures of Brady material, there
was significant scholarly debate about a defendant’s ability to waive the right to
receive Brady evidence. See, e.g., Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers
Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2013 (2000); Erica G. Franklin, Waiving Prosecutorial
Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers,
51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1999).
33. The prosecutor’s extensive discretion and power in plea bargaining is the
result of a number of Supreme Court rulings. See e.g., Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (“The
“Constitution does not require the government to disclose material impeachment
evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”); Wade v.
United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (holding that federal prosecutors have
extensive discretion to file or withhold a motion to reduce a defendant’s sentence for
the defendant’s “substantial assistance” to the government in prosecuting other
crimes or other criminals); Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1178–79 (noting that
prosecutors are permitted to “act for the very purpose of avoiding the exposition of
the government action” which could include police racism, an illegal search, or to
minimize civil damages in a subsequent civil suit).
34. See Benjamin Weiser, Doubting Case, City Prosecutor Aided Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A1; see also Melanie D. Wilson, Finding a Happy and
Ethical Medium Between a Prosecutor Who Believes the Defendant Didn’t Do It and
the Boss Who Says that He Did, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 65, 65–71 (2008).
35. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963).
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decision in Brady requires the prosecutor to search her files—and
those of agents and agencies working on the prosecution’s behalf—
for evidence favorable to the accused. 36 Such evidence might, for
instance, involve information bearing on the credibility of a
witness.37 Although this directive sounds simple enough, bright lines
have proven elusive in practice. In countless cases, sometimes
uncovered years after the fact, prosecutors have breached their duty
to produce Brady materials. 38 Many scholars and criminal justice
lawyers assert that Brady is the most abused and corrosive problem
created by prosecutors. 39
Like the plea bargaining process, prosecutors review
investigative files for Brady evidence under a cloak of secrecy.
Without consulting the defense or the courts, prosecutors alone
decide whether a witness statement or other evidence is material
and helpful to the defense’s case. Prosecutors conduct this review
knowing that 97% of all federal prosecutions and 94% of all state
prosecutions are resolved by plea bargaining and not through a trial
that may expose a Brady failure.40 Likewise, they conduct the Brady
review with at least some pressure from supervisors to win a
conviction. 41 These pressures and the cloak of secrecy lead to the
widespread failure of prosecutors to satisfy their duty of evenhandedness.
Because there are strong parallels—such as the exercise of
extensive, unfettered power with minimal external oversight—
between the way prosecutors handle plea bargaining and Brady

36. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
37. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
38. See Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s Misbehaving Prosecutors,
And the System That Protects Them, HUFF POST POLITICS, Aug. 1, 2013,
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconeduct-new-orleans-louisian
a_n_3529891.html (asserting that “one of the most pervasive misdeeds” by
prosecutors is “the Brady violation”—“the most common form of misconduct cited by
courts in overturning convictions.”); id. (quoting Sam Dalton, a Louisiana lawyer who
“started a public defender system for indigent defendants” and “will begin his 60th
year practicing law,” who claims: “Brady made things a little better, at least at
first . . . The younger prosecutors tried to take it seriously, and would try to comply,
but there was still a community standard to evade disclosure. So they’d actually hide
it from their bosses when they’d turn over favorable evidence to us.”); see also supra
note 16.
39. Id.
40. See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the “Bazaar” of Plea Deals,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A12; see also U.S. Atty’s Annual Statistical Report:
Fiscal Year 2010, DEP’T OF JUST. 10, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading
_room/reports/asr2010/10statrpt.pdf.
41. See infra Part III.B.
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obligations on the one hand and the way in which prosecutors build
cases with FISA evidence on the other, prosecutors’ failures in the
plea bargaining and Brady contexts offer significant lessons for the
FISA cases that are coming to fore. This Article examines these
lessons.
Focusing on the prosecutor’s ethical obligation “to seek justice,” 42
this Article argues that the failure of prosecutors to comply strictly
and timely with FISA’s disclosure provision is inevitable; yet, the
prosecutor’s ethical duty to “seek justice” requires compliance. In
other words, a prosecutor’s duty of justice is an unobtainable
aspiration when prosecutors make decisions involving compelling
and competing interests without the benefit of capable adversarial,
judicial or public influences. 43 Relying on several recent prosecutions
built with FISA evidence, as well as two familiar prosecution
contexts—plea bargaining 44 and the evaluation of exculpatory

42. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
43. As developed further in Part III.C., this argument is supported by the
Department of Justice’s actions leading up to the Florida and Chicago prosecutions
mentioned in the introduction. In October, 2012, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli,
Jr., argued a civil case before the U.S. Supreme Court in which he contended that the
complaining parties lacked standing to assert claims about the wiretapping of
conversations, but he said that certain criminal defendants would have standing to
challenge such wiretapping. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154
(2013) (indicating that “if the Government intends to use or disclose information
obtained or derived from [the FISA amendments] in judicial or administrative
proceedings, it must provide advance notice of its intent, and the affected person may
challenge the lawfulness of the acquisition.”); see also Oral Argument Transcript of
Solicitor General Verrilli, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (Oct. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_1025 (stating “Your
Honor, under the statute, there are two clear examples of situations in which
individuals would have standing. The first is if an aggrieved person, someone who is
a party to a communication, gets notice that the government intends to introduce
information in a proceeding against them.”); Savage, supra note 21, at A3 (noting Mr.
Verrilli’s concession that prosecutors are obligated to notify defendants when they
use evidence derived from covert surveillance). After Mr. Verrilli’s public
acknowledgement of the disclosure obligation, prosecutors continued to withhold
surveillance information in criminal cases. Id. (explaining that “national security
lawyers” narrowly interpreted the words “derived from” so as to avoid disclosure
obligations and that national security lawyers argued that “the rules on wiretapping
warrants in foreign intelligence cases are different from the rules in ordinary
criminal investigations . . . .”).
44. For purposes of this Article, the plea bargaining process includes plea
negotiations, the exchange of discovery, and the filing of motions and corresponding
evidentiary hearings on those motions that occur after charging and before the entry
of a guilty plea.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430961

710

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:699

“Brady” 45 material—this Article reveals the overwhelming
disincentives preventing prosecutors from “doing justice” when they
make decisions behind closed doors. The FISA context like other,
analogous, settings in which prosecutors make decisions in
seclusion, does not create the milieu where the ethic of doing justice
can flourish. 46 Doing justice in our system requires adversarial
judicial proceedings or some equivalent outside influence as a check
on prosecutors’ power and discretion.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II outlines more fully a
prosecutor’s unique ethical duties, providing the backdrop to
understand the tension prosecutors experience when evaluating
FISA cases and similar issues without external justice-promoting
influences. It emphasizes the prosecutor’s duty to employ fair means,
not just reach favorable results. Part III explores the ethical risks
inherent in plea bargaining and the ethical hazards prosecutors face
during the review of criminal cases for exculpatory “Brady” evidence.
It discusses the pertinent FISA provision and provides several recent
examples of criminal cases in which prosecutors resisted compliance
with FISA’s mandatory disclosure provision, Section 1806(c). Part III
also establishes that countless prosecutors have breached their
ethical and professional obligations in all of these contexts, each of
which involve decision making behind-the-scenes, necessarily
encouraging prosecutors to focus on goals other than
evenhandedness and integrity of the system. Part IV evaluates the
patterns developing from these prosecutorial failures and offers
lessons, warnings, and guidance for prosecutors and judges going
forward, especially for matters involving covertly acquired FISA
evidence. From these analyses, the Article concludes that, if we are
to foster the “doing justice” duty in prosecutors, the criminal justice

45. “Brady evidence” and “Brady material” are common references to the
prosecutor’s duty to disclose material evidence favorable to an accused in a criminal
case. The duty of disclosure was established by the Supreme Court in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
46. See David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two
Counties, 19 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 115, 116 (1994) (“Plea bargaining . . . is a closeddoor affair that is not readily amenable to observation by outsiders.”); see also
Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1139 (citation omitted) (“As a process, plea bargaining
lacks many of the building blocks of adversarial theory, including the presence of
neutral and passive decision makers and rules that govern the evidentiary and
arbitration process.”); id. at 1178 (citation omitted) (“One general criticism of plea
bargaining is that it eliminates the public aspect of criminal prosecutions. Insofar as
criminal trials serve to illuminate wrongdoing by the police, prosecutor, or some
other agency of government, accepting plea bargains serves to cover up the
misconduct.”).
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system must not place prosecutors in settings that lack adversarial
or judicial checks upon their vast power and discretion.
II. PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS—A DISTINCTIVE DUTY OF JUSTICE
Prosecutors owe a duty to take the moral high ground and act
fairly and “justly” in all of their responsibilities. But the requirement
to “seek justice” is a vague and protean concept 47 that strains even
the most moral of prosecutors, permitting them to slip in and out of
compliance with their ethical responsibilities—assuming the
prosecutor can determine what course of action is required of an
ethical prosecutor.
A. The Duty
For well over one hundred years, courts in this country have
recognized a prosecutor’s heightened obligation of fair conduct
beyond that owed by other lawyers. 48 In 1872, the Michigan
Supreme Court described the prosecutor’s role in the criminal justice
process this way:

47. See Green, supra note 14, at 608.
48. See Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 415–16 (1872) (“[T]he prosecution can
never, in a criminal case, properly claim a conviction upon evidence which, expressly
or by implication, shows but a part of the res gestae, or whole transaction . . . .”); see
also Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16, 23 (1874) (“a public prosecutor is . . . a sworn
minister of justice, as much bound to protect the innocent as to pursue the
guilty . . . .”). Wellar involved a murder trial in which the prosecution failed to
present one of two witnesses to a homicide. The court reversed the conviction and
granted a new trial, ruling that the prosecutor “ha[d] no right to suppress testimony”
by failing to present all witnesses, whether favorable or unfavorable, to the alleged
crime. Id.; see also People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 350–51
(Cal. 1985) ([The prosecutor] “must refrain from abusing . . . power by failing to act
evenhandedly”; “[o]ur system relies for its validity on the confidence of society,
without a belief by the people that the system is just and impartial, the concept of
the rule of law cannot survive;” [The] “prosecutor’s “duty of neutrality is born of two
fundamental aspects of his employment. First, he is a representative of the
sovereign; he must act with impartiality required of those who govern. Second, he
has the vast power of the government available to him; he must refrain from abusing
that power by failing to act evenhandedly.”); Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 104
(1875) (“[The prosecutor’s] position is one involving a duty of impartiality not
altogether unlike that of the judge himself. We have had occasion heretofore to refer
to this duty in these officers of justice. Their position is a trying one, but the duty
nevertheless exists . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 323 A.2d 797, 798 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1974) (“[T]he prosecutor ‘enjoys an office of unusual responsibility.’”).
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The prosecuting officer represents the public interest, which
can never be promoted by the conviction of the innocent. His
object like that of the court, should be simply justice: and he
has no right to sacrifice this to any pride of professional
success. And however strong may be his belief of the
prisoner’s guilt, he must remember that, though unfair
means may happen to result in doing justice to the prisoner
in the particular case, yet, justice so attained, is unjust and
dangerous to the whole community.49
The California Supreme Court spoke similarly in 1889:
Equally with the court the district attorney, as the
representative of law and justice, should be fair and
impartial. He should remember that it is not his sole duty to
convict, and that to use his official position to obtain a verdict
by illegitimate and unfair means is to bring his office and the
courts into distrust. We make due allowance for the zeal
which is the natural result of such a legal battle . . . and for
the desire of every lawyer to win his case, but these should be
overcome by the conscientious desire of a sworn officer of the
court to do his duty, and not go beyond it. 50
The California Supreme Court also noted the substantial risks to
society when prosecutors breach this ethical duty of fairness. “Our
system relies for its validity on the confidence of society, without a
belief by the people that the system is just and impartial, the
concept of the rule of law cannot survive.” 51
By the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court also expressly
acknowledged the prosecutor’s unique responsibility, declaring:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. 52
The Criminal Justice Standards of the American Bar Association
reiterate this duty of prosecutorial fairness, explaining: “The
prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer

49.
50.
51.
52.

Hurd, 25 Mich. at 415–16.
People v. Lee Chuck, 20 P. 719, 723 (Cal. 1889).
People ex rel. Clancy, 705 P.2d at 350.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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of the court . . . The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict.” 53
In other words, for well over one hundred years and continuing
to modern day, state and federal courts have viewed the prosecutor’s
duty to function in an even-handed manner as an imperative for the
proper operation of our system of justice. 54 “Not only is a government
lawyer’s neutrality essential to a fair outcome for the litigants in the
case in which he is involved, it is essential to the proper function of
the judicial process as a whole.” 55
Despite agreement that prosecutors must act with a sense of
evenhandedness and general virtue, in practice, prosecutors often
face doubts about how these benevolent principles work in specific
factual contexts.
B. The Risks
On the one hand, requiring prosecutors to act justly seems
obvious. Any legitimate criminal system cannot survive if
prosecutors are sinister, self-interested, or profit-motivated. On the
other hand, the concept of “seeking justice” is nebulous. 56 Two wellintentioned prosecutors may disagree—slightly or significantly—
about what course of action in a given case is warranted to serve
retributive, deterrent, rehabilitative, efficiency, privacy, security,
and other goals. “Doing justice” inherently requires a prosecutor to
exercise discretion. In turn, discretion grants prosecutors flexibility
in investigating and charging crimes, preparing for trial, choosing
and examining witnesses, bargaining to resolve charges, and
recommending a sentence upon conviction. 57 This leeway may cause
one prosecutor to charge a defendant with three crimes while
another charges only two; it may lead a prosecutor to seek a
mandatory minimum sentence while a second opts for an indictment
that grants more sentencing discretion to the judge. One prosecutor
may call four witnesses, including a questionable, “snitch” witness,
to prove her case to a jury, while a different prosecutor subpoenas
only two and rejects the snitch’s offer to testify, believing that

53. Standard 3-1.2(b) and (c), supra note 1.
54. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 68 (referring to a prosecutor as a “minister
of justice”).
55. People ex rel. Clancy, 705 P.2d 347, 351 (1985).
56. See Green, supra note 14, at 608 (describing the federal prosecutor’s duty of
justice as “protean as well as vague”).
57. Id. at 608–10 (asserting that the duty of justice “assumed different
meanings in different contexts, meanings that one could only infer” and indicating a
“need to give content to the federal prosecutor’s professional obligations.”).
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snitches create risks of lies and thereby undermine justice.58 Some
prosecutors maintain an “open file” policy for pretrial discovery. 59
Others produce only the minimum evidence mandated by the
Constitution and the rules of discovery. 60 Are all of these prosecutors
seeking justice? If not, which ones are? Is it possible for each of them
to “do justice” while pursuing such different strategies?
It is rarely obvious which course of action justice requires
because the meaning of “justice,” like the meaning of “fairness,” is
often open to debate. In attempting to give meaning to the words,
scholars and courts often compare prosecutors to judges,
“characterizing public prosecution as a quasi-judicial role and
envisioning this role as the wellspring of a prosecutor’s professional
obligations.” 61 Professor Bruce Green describes the role as
“somewhere between judges, on the one hand, and lawyers
advocating on behalf of private clients, on the other.” 62 Green
contends that justice “might imply an obligation of fairness in a
procedural sense. Or, it might imply a substantive obligation of
fairness—for example, an affirmative duty to ensure that innocent
people are not convicted.” 63 Green adds, “Rarely, if ever, does it
provide much insight into hard questions about the scope of proper
prosecutorial conduct.” 64 Professor Michael R. Cassidy has noted
that “[t]he legal profession has left much of a prosecutor’s day-to-day
decision-making unregulated, in favor of [a] catch-all ‘seek justice’
admonition.” 65 And, like Green, Cassidy views many tasks of a
prosecutor as “quasi-judicial functions that require them to step out
of a purely adversarial role.” 66 Like Green and Cassidy, the late

58.

See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
76–78 (2009).
59. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to
Do With It?, 23 CRIM. JUST., no. 3, 29, 32–33 (Fall 2008).
60. See id. at 30–31.
61. Green, supra note 14, at 613.
62. Id. at 615.
63. Id. at 622 (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 623.
65. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach
Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635,
637 (2006) (citing Green, supra note 14, at 616).
66. Id. at 651 (referencing Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 13.10.1
at 759 (1986) and Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A
Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 227 (1988)). The late Professor
Richard Uviller, a professor of criminal law at Columbia University, who died in
2005, also characterized plea bargaining as similar to criminal investigation and the
charging process, which he described as quasi-judicial. H. Richard Uviller, The
Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
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prosecutorial ethics scholar Fred Zacharias used the plea bargaining
context to note the lack of clear direction for prosecutors. 67 Zacharias
argued that when plea bargaining, it is “unclear what duties, if any,
prosecutors have to defendants . . . or to the legal system, other than
to believe that a defendant is guilty before accepting a plea.” 68
This uncertainty, which follows naturally from discretion, leads
prosecutors to slip in and out of compliance with their ethical
obligations. When the lines become fuzzy regarding the right course
of action, it is easy for prosecutors to fall back on their adversarial
instincts—for instance, winning a conviction regardless of costs.
Prosecutors are especially prone to such slippage when they act
without the justice-enhancing influences from the public, judges,
petit and grand jurors—in other words, when they act in an antijustice environment, such as seclusion.
In fact, secrecy tends to undermine justice norms, even when the
prosecutor’s duty is well defined. Before turning to Part IV, which
explains the damaging effects of secrecy on the prosecutor’s ethical
duties to produce covert surveillance information in compliance with
FISA’s statutory directive, Part III (below) illustrates the risk of
ethical slippage in the plea bargaining context in which the
parameters of justice are elusive and in the Brady context in which
the rules are certain, but prosecutors decide single-handedly and
secretly which evidence they must produce to comply with the rules.
In both situations, prosecutors struggle to comply with the duty to
seek justice. These traditional settings offer lessons for the more
modern FISA context, as discussed in Part IV.
III. PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS—PLEA BARGAINING, BRADY REVIEWS, AND
CASES INVOLVING COVERTLY ACQUIRED FISA EVIDENCE

Plea bargaining, in which prosecutors wield significant discretion
and far-reaching power and sometimes assert extensive pressure on
defendants to forego important rights 69—such as a right to

FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1700–01 (2000); H. Richard Uviller, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL, www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2005_older/2005/april
_1/uviller_obit (last visited August 30, 2014).
67. Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1124.
68. Id.
69. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 169, 179–80 (1997) (noting that it is difficult to quantify and compare the
benefits that the government versus the defendant receive from a plea); see also
Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1132–33 (contending that a plea bargain has “coercive
elements” missing in the civil context).
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discovery,70 the right to exculpatory evidence, and the right to
appeal errors, including errors by incompetent defense counsel 71—
reveals that the ideal of even-handed justice is unlikely when
powerful prosecutors operate behind closed doors. 72 Likewise, the
many cases in which prosecutors have mismanaged the evaluation
and production of Brady evidence 73 expose the probability for abuses
when prosecutors lack oversight for their decisions, even when the
rules are clear for how ethical prosecutors should act in that
context.74 Recent terrorism cases in which prosecutors have refused
to disclose FISA evidence, defying a clear statutory directive as well
as pointed guidance from the Solicitor General, accentuate the need
for more transparency in the criminal justice process if prosecutors
are expected to serve as both advocate and impartial referee of fair
dealing. 75
A. Negotiating Plea Deals Creates Ethical Slippage
In the federal system, supervisory prosecutors regularly impose
blanket directives on their underlings, favoring efficiency goals to
the exclusion of others. 76 The bureaucratic efficiency interests
include: gaining a statistic of conviction, resolving the pending case
quickly, and reducing the likelihood that the defendant will pursue

70. See discussion of Brady and Ruiz infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.
71. See discussion infra Part III.A.4 (discussing waivers of rights to appeal,
including right to assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).
72. Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky has said of plea negotiation: “The words ‘ethics’
and ‘plea bargaining’ are rarely used in the same sentence . . . . In many
jurisdictions . . . [t]he prosecution makes an offer; the defense lawyer after minimal
or no investigation discusses the plea with the client who decides to take the offer to
ensure a lesser sentence . . . .” Yaroshefsky, supra note 59, at 28. It’s no surprise that
ethics is not the priority of plea bargaining. Even the Supreme Court has sent an
anti-justice message about the prosecutor’s duty in this context, announcing:
“‘Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea
and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s
criminal justice system.’” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361–62 (1978)
(citing Blacklege v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)).
73. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); discussion infra Part III.B.
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1983).
75. Ellen Nakashima, Man Convicted in Terrorism Case Seeks Evidence From
Warrantless NSA Surveilannce WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpo
st.com/world/national-security/man-convicted-in-terror-case-challenges-warrantlessspying/2014/01/13/af7da5de-7cba-11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html.
76. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL,
TITLE 9, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 626 (1997), available at www.justice.gov/us
ao/eousa/foia_readingroom/usam/title9/crm00626.htm.
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an appeal or litigate any other claim against the government
following sentencing.77 These influences exclusively favor efficacy
and resource preservation and are not counterbalanced with other
“doing justice” norms. Although efficiency may support justice in
some cases, in others, saving government resources tends to subvert
major components of the prosecutor’s responsibilities of justice, such
as ensuring that the unique circumstances of the offense and
characteristics of the defendant are considered in resolving a case,
exposing unconstitutional behavior by government actors—whether
police or prosecutors, evaluating evidence for proof of the suspect’s
guilt, and guaranteeing that all defendants receive procedural
fairness. 78 If, for example, an accused receives ineffective assistance
of counsel in evaluating her case and recommending a plea, we
cannot be certain that the accused is deserving of prosecution or
punishment. These deficiencies, in turn, weaken societal confidence
in the criminal justice system and reduce respect for the rule of law.
Plea bargaining induces prosecutors to serve efficiency 79 at the
expense of other, equally important, long-term goals that are
required for justice.80 Prosecutors are repeatedly told—formally and
informally, by supervisory prosecutors, by legal precedent, and

77. See, e.g., Holder Memo, supra note 15; see also David E. Carney, Waiver of
the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the Federal Government, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1999) (citing United States v. Johnson, 992 F.
Supp. 437, 438 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting plea agreement)); Zacharias, supra note 30, at
1178–79 (noting that prosecutors are permitted to “act for the very purpose of
avoiding the exposition of the government action” which could include police racism,
an illegal search, or to minimize civil damages in a subsequent civil suit).
78. See Green, supra note 14 at 642 (acknowledging that “a prosecutor is a
representative of, as well as a lawyer for, a government entity that has several
different, sometimes seemingly inconsistent, objectives in the criminal context”);
Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1124 (asserting that plea bargaining “does not fit the
adversarial model” of justice); id. at 1150 (“applying different theories of plea
bargaining produces different conceptions of justice”); id. at 1182 (“[b]ecause the
prosecutor represents varying interests and constituencies, it is no easy matter for
her to identify just behavior”) (internal footnote omitted).
79. Plea bargains “save[] prosecutorial and judicial resources.” Zacharias, supra
note 30, at 1138 (internal citation omitted); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 260 (1971) (focusing on expediency in the form of plea bargains as an important
aspect of the criminal justice system, describing plea bargaining as “an essential
component of the administration of justice.”). Scholars have also argued that
abolishing plea bargaining “would raise the average cost of prosecution because it
would increase the percentage of cases that go to trial (and even slimmed-down,
cheaper trials will be more expensive than bargained pleas).” Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 15, at 1932.
80. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 59, at 32–33.
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sometimes even by presiding judges—to resolve cases, to obtain the
dismissal of pending motions, and to convince defendants to waive
their constitutional and statutory rights as part of the bargain. 81
This institutional obsession with efficacy regularly conflicts with the
prosecutor’s other responsibilities, such as: treating similarlysituated defendants alike, ensuring that the accused is held fully
accountable for his crimes, providing the public with assurances that
the criminal justice process is fair—including examining law
enforcement and prosecutor conduct for constitutional minimums,
giving victims adequate channels for input, and evaluating evidence
in each case for weaknesses or other signs that the accused is
innocent of the crimes charged. 82 Because the prosecutor owes
allegiances to multiple “clients,” 83 her varied ethical responsibilities
are often in direct tension with one another. 84 Especially given that
plea bargaining occurs behind closed doors, plea outcomes are often
less than ideal, leading prosecutors to fall short on their duty “to
seek justice.” Considering the various internal pressures on

81. See Alan Vinegrad, Justice Department’s New Charging, Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing Policy, 243 N.Y.L.J., no. 110 (June 10, 2010) (explaining the everchanging DOJ sentencing, plea bargaining, and charging guidelines, handed down to
federal prosecutors with each new U.S. Attorney General, and examining Attorney
General Holder’s less restrictive guidelines in light of former Attorney General
Ashcroft’s directives); see also Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden
on Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery to Department
OF
JUST.
(Jan.
4,
2010),
available
at
Prosecutors,
DEPT.
www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html (providing guidance on gathering,
reviewing, and producing discovery, including Brady information); Ashcroft Memo,
supra note 15 (setting departmental policy on charging and sentencing, including
requiring prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case”); Holder Memo, supra
note 15 (setting departmental policy on charging and sentencing, including
emphasizing the “reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion” in prosecuting cases).
82. Robert Scott and William Stuntz, argued:
There is something puzzling about the polarity of contemporary reactions to
[plea bargaining]. Most legal scholars oppose plea bargaining, finding it
both inefficient and unjust. Nevertheless, most participants in the plea
bargaining process, including (perhaps especially) the courts, seem
remarkably untroubled by it. Not only is the practice widespread, but
participants generally approve of it.
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1909–10; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2010)
(identifying factors to be considered in imposing a sentence).
83. See sources cited supra note 11 and accompanying text (recognizing duty to
the government as well as to the people).
84. See Zacharias, supra note 69, at 172.
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prosecutors, including heavy case loads—which benefit from early
plea deals—and demands from supervisors to cut deals—to reduce
judicial backlogs, improve office statistics on the number of cases
prosecuted successfully, and avoid future litigation, including
hearings on motions to suppress—plea bargaining can fairly be
characterized as an anti-justice process.85
Professors Robert Scott 86 and William Stuntz 87 have said that by
entering into a plea agreement, the attorneys in a criminal case shift
the risks of winning or losing. 88 “Before contracting [for a plea], the
defendant bears the risk of conviction with the maximum sentence
while the prosecutor bears the reciprocal risk of a costly trial 89
followed by acquittal. An enforceable plea bargain reassigns these
risks.” 90 Once a plea deal is reached, Scott and Stuntz explain that
“the defendant bears the risk that a trial would have resulted in
acquittal or a lighter sentence, while the prosecutor bears the risk
that she could have obtained the maximum (or at least a greater)
sentence if the case had gone to trial.” 91
Risk shifting also accounts for several of the influences during
plea bargaining that undercut justice norms. In addition to the risk
of an acquittal, prosecutors understand the chances that the
government will obtain a conviction at trial but later be left to
handle extended appeals and post-conviction attacks on the

85. In his article Justice in Plea Bargaining, Fred Zacharias outlined several
goals of justice, including: approximating trial results; seeking equitable results
between similarly-situated defendants; seeking equitable ends; and saving
government resources, among others. Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1144. Even though
Zacharias outlined many possible goals, he concluded that the various justifications
for pleas could be divided into two broad categories: 1) those that “assume that the
plea-bargaining process will bring about an appropriate, perhaps even an optimal,
result[,]” and 2) justifications which “rest[] on notions of efficiency or resource
preservation.” Id. at 1136–38.
86. Scott is a law professor at Columbia. Robert E. Scott, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL, www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Robert_Scott (last visited August 31, 2014).
87. Stuntz was a law professor at Harvard. He died in 2011 after an extended
battle with cancer. See Douglas Martin, W.J. Stuntz 52, Stimulated Legal Minds,
N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, at A23.
88. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1924.
89. In Plea Bargaining as Contract, Scott and Stuntz talk in terms of the
opportunity costs of trials. “Each defendant can call on the prosecutor to try the case,
forcing her to use time and effort that would otherwise be spent processing other
cases. For the prosecutor, the opportunity cost of a failure to purchase this call from
any individual defendant substantially exceeds the transaction costs of negotiating
an individualized contract.” Id.
90. Id. at 1914.
91. Id.
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judgment—both
time-consuming
and
resource-intensive
possibilities.92 And trials, which are necessarily public, 93 may expose
prosecutorial or police misconduct and violations of statutory and
constitutional duties—activities that undermine judicial confidence
in prosecutors and law enforcement and erode public confidence in
the whole justice system. 94 These possible consequences of trial—in
addition to the chance of acquittal—explain why prosecutors
routinely demand extensive concessions from a defendant as part of
plea bargaining, including that she forego receipt of exculpatory and
other discovery material and waive any right of appeal. 95 Indeed,
federal prosecutors regularly threaten to withhold acceptance of
responsibility credits (which reduce sentence length) 96 and
sometimes cajole defendants into dismissing or withdrawing motions
to suppress evidence or confessions obtained illegally as a condition
of a plea offer. 97
If prosecutors were merely expected to exercise their professional
judgment and to assess the likelihood that a given set of evidence
would result in a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, “doing
justice” in the plea context would require only experience, effort, and
good faith. Because of the many anti-justice influences discussed
above, and detailed more below, a prosecutor’s role in evaluating the
costs of trial versus the benefits of a plea deal is much more complex.
In failing to reach a plea agreement with a defendant, a prosecutor
risks an acquittal or a guilty verdict on a charge less serious than
desired, exposing unconstitutional conduct by police, revealing
unethical or illegal conduct by the prosecution, creating the
likelihood of drawn out appeals and habeas attacks after trial, and
being burdened by the usual time commitment and costs associated

92. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1144–45.
93. U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
94. As the growing number of established Brady violations alone demonstrates,
this is a real cost of proceeding to trial. See infra Part III.B.
95. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1124–26.
96. See United States Sentencing Commission, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1
(2013) (allowing a decrease in a defendant’s offense level for accepting “responsibility
for his offense.”).
97. See An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug
Defendants to Plead Guilty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (Dec. 2013) (“in the US plea
bargaining system, many federal prosecutors strong-arm defendants by offering
them shorter prison terms if they plead guilty . . . .”), available at http://www.hrw.org
/sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0.pdf; see also Offenders Receiving
Acceptance of Responsibility Reductions in Each Primary Offense Category, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statisti
cs/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/Table19.pdf.
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with preparing for and presenting evidence. 98 In other words,
prosecutors typically have significant incentives to reach a plea
agreement, and defendants do too. 99 Because of the numerous and
varied risks and costs associated with trial, prosecutors experience
strong pressures to negotiate harsh terms as part of a plea bargain,
and defendants feel intense pressure to accept the deal
notwithstanding the harsh terms. 100 This negotiation often thwarts
rather than supports “seeking justice.”
The following section describes some of the harsh, anti-justice
terms and consequences of modern plea bargaining.
1. The Prosecutor May Withhold a Sentence Reduction Even
After the Defendant Substantially Assists the Government
In 1992, the Supreme Court held in Wade v. United States that
federal prosecutors may, at their discretion, withhold a motion to
reduce a defendant’s sentence, even after the defendant provides the
government with substantial help in prosecuting other crimes and
criminals.101 “[A] claim that a defendant merely provided substantial
assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to
discovery or an evidentiary hearing” on the exercise of the
prosecutor’s discretion. 102 Thus, “a showing of assistance [by the
defendant] is a necessary condition for relief, [but] it is not a
sufficient one.”103 Only if the prosecutor acts irrationally or with
unconstitutional motives may the trial judge limit the prosecutor’s
discretion in this context. 104
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wade, prosecutors
regularly add a paragraph to the plea contract, allowing the
prosecution nearly unfettered discretion in deciding whether or not
to ask the court to reduce the defendant’s post-plea sentence
following the defendant’s cooperation in the prosecution of other

98. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in
the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 24–25 (2002) (explaining that
prosecutors face many risks with going to trial and weigh them against the benefits
of plea bargaining).
99. For instance, the federal sentencing guidelines permit the sentencing judge
to reduce the sentence of a defendant who accepts responsibility for her misconduct
or for providing substantial assistance to the government in the investigation and
prosecution of other crimes. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013).
100. See An Offer You Can’t Refuse, supra note 97, at 1; Vinegrad, supra note 81.
101. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 187.
104. Id. at 185–86.
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cases. 105 Not uncommonly, the prosecution refuses to file a motion to
reduce the defendant’s sentence despite the defendant’s, sometimes
significant, help. 106 This unpredictability associated with prosecutors
giving and rescinding benefits for a defendant’s cooperation
undermines defense lawyers’ (and sometimes judges’) confidence in
prosecutors generally. 107 Defense counsel cannot reliably advise a
client to share significant information (often at great physical risk to
the accused) with the expectation of earning a lower sentence.108 The
odds are that the accused will cooperate and will provide relevant
and helpful information, but that assistance will not ultimately lead
to a reduced sentence for him. 109
In addition to the loss of trust that results from the fickle
application of sentencing reductions for substantial assistance, the
inconsistent use of these enticements results in both an
underutilization and overutilization of cooperating witnesses. 110 The
underutilization follows when defendants become reluctant to offer
assistance, understanding that even if they testify against a
substantial criminal, the prosecutor may refuse to ask the judge to
shorten their sentence.111 The overutilization results because the
incentive system encourages cooperating defendants to exaggerate
the help they can give—even to the point of providing false
testimony—to convince the prosecutor to support a sentence
reduction. 112 Because relatively few defendants receive the benefit of
a government motion to reduce their sentence, they will naturally
feel pressure to impress the prosecutor with sufficient information
and evidence to assure a benefit. 113 They may well be reluctant to
admit that the information they possess is limited.

105. See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis—
Reminders to Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 90–93
(2008) (discussing the many instances in which defendants cooperate with the
government but are given no credit for the assistance at sentencing).
106. Id. at 75–77; see also Alan Ellis, Federal Sentencing: Practice Tips: Part 1,
20 CRIM. JUST. 55, 55 (2006).
107. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 73 (1995);
Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, The Prisoner’s Dilemma becomes the Lawyer’s
Dilemma: To be a zealous advocate or a Judas goat?, MONT. LAW., Dec. 2009/Jan.
2010 at 29.
108. See sources cited supra note 107.
109. See sources cited supra note 107.
110. See Wilson, supra note 105, at 70.
111. Id. at 87–89.
112. See NATAPOFF, supra note 58, at 69–81.
113. See Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An
Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Practice, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 1, 10 (Jan. 1998).
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In both cases, prosecutors fail to seek justice. Justice is
undermined, not supported, when a prosecutor denies a benefit
specifically provided for in the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
He also thwarts justice when he relies on false evidence from an
unreliable cooperating defendant who exaggerates her knowledge to
please the prosecutor.
2. The Prosecutor May Withhold Exculpatory Evidence From
a Defendant to Encourage Her to Make a Deal
Ten years after Wade, in United States v. Ruiz,114 the Supreme
Court held that the “Constitution does not require the Government
to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant.” 115 Thus, after the decision in
Ruiz, prosecutors’ “Brady” obligations were limited to cases going to
trial. Before Ruiz, many federal circuit courts had required
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense before
any plea deal was finalized. 116 Giving the defense such impeachment
information before a plea deal was reached helped ensure that the
defendant had enough information to accurately weigh the risks of
trial, evaluate the realistic chances of acquittal, and knowledgeably
decide whether to forego significant constitutional rights 117 as part
of a plea deal. 118

114. 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
115. Id.; see also id. at 629 (emphasizing that “the Constitution does not require
the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant.”).
116. Yaroshefsky, supra note 59, at 31 (“Until 2002, there was a trend in federal
and state courts that prosecutors had a duty to disclose Brady material prior to a
guilty plea.”); see also Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that an
evidentiary hearing is required when petitioner’s Brady claim “if borne out, would
entitle petitioner to relief.”). But see Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that prosecutors must only disclose exculpatory evidence to
defendants in the case of a guilty plea, if “there is a reasonable probability that but
for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have refused to
plead and would have gone to trial.”); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 324 (6th
Cir. 1985) (failing to find violation of due process in the suppression of Brady
material prior plea of guilty, noting “a plea decision is not made with any perfect
knowledge of the results were a trial to be held.”); United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d
1303, 1313 (7th Cir. 1977) (refusing to interpret Brady as requiring the prosecution
to produce inculpatory as well as exculpatory evidence so that defendant could
evaluate the benefits of pleading guilty to receive a more lenient sentence).
117. These rights include: the right to subpoena witnesses and evidence, U.S.
CONST. amend. VI, to have a jury adjudicate guilt, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, to insist
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979),
the right to confront her accusers, U.S. CONST. amend VI, and many others. See also
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The Ruiz decision added to the anti-justice nature of plea
bargaining. As an initial matter, the ruling probably increased the
number of defendants who plead guilty. When the defense is
ignorant of material evidence undermining the credibility of the
government’s witnesses, evidence which may be developed to create
reasonable doubt at trial, the risk of conviction appears greater than
it really is, leading rational defendants to favor a plea bargain over a
trial. In turn, these pre-discovery, pre-Brady deals lead to other antijustice consequences. There is growing evidence that with some
regularity, prosecutors fail to comply with their Brady obligations in
cases that are tried.119 Prosecutors’ inattention to their Brady
obligations may result, in part, from the implied message in Ruiz
that material information favorable to the defense is not an
imperative part of the accused’s due process, fair trial rights. After
all, if such evidence was crucial for a fair evaluation of the case, the
Court would require its production before accepting the defendant’s
plea of guilty.
In addition, after Ruiz, a prosecutor may “act for the very
purpose of avoiding the exposition of the governmental action”; this
could be police racism, an illegal search, an un-Mirandized
confession, or to minimize the likely civil damages award in a
subsequent civil rights action. 120 Prosecutors who learn that the
accused—or some other target of the investigation—suffered
physical abuse or was the victim of unconstitutional behavior may
well cover up the bad behaviors by offering sentencing concessions
while insisting that the defendant forego (or withdraw) any motion
to raise such issues before the trial court. Likewise, because of Ruiz,
prosecutors may continue to rely on investigations conducted by
“Giglio impaired” 121 law enforcement officers, meaning officers who
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628–29 (noting that “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of
course, forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional
guarantees.”).
118. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Miller
v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d. Cir. 1998)) (“A waiver cannot be deemed
‘intelligent and voluntary’ if ‘entered without knowledge of material information
withheld by the prosecution.’”) (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d
Cir. 1988).
119. See infra Part III.B.
120. Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1178.
121. This is a slang way to refer to law enforcement agents who, because of past
misdeeds, are subject to impeachment by the defense. It derives from Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972), in which the Court held that a prosecutor
violates her Brady obligations by failing to reveal at trial that a witness was
promised leniency in exchange for his testimony. I learned this reference as a
prosecutor in the Northern District of Georgia when I was an assistant U.S.
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are subject to extensive impeachment because of previous
misbehaviors. Because most cases resolve by plea, and given that
prosecutors can wait to disclose impeachment evidence until the
trial (or shortly before), significantly less pressure exists for law
enforcement agencies to drive out officers who are prone to
unconstitutional or unlawful behaviors.122 The ability of prosecutors
to shield unlawful police conduct may seem defensible in a given
case, but the wide-spread practice runs the risk of jeopardizing
societal rights and expectations as a whole. 123
3. Because of the Prevalence of Guilty Pleas, the Prosecutor
May Delay Careful Evaluation of a Case, Until the Eve of
Trial, Resulting in the Possibility That Innocent Defendants
Will Plead Guilty
Because more than 97% of all criminal cases now end with the
defendant’s plea of guilty, a prosecutor with a heavy case load is
encouraged to conserve her time and resources by preparing only
those cases she expects to end in trial. 124 Especially in state
prosecutors’ offices with extensive caseloads,125 this means that the
vast majority of cases receive only cursory attention until a trial
becomes likely. In turn, weaknesses in the evidence and credibility
issues with witnesses may never be explored. This is particularly
problematic for “seeking justice,” given that innocent people have
and do plead guilty. 126

attorney.
122. See John Conroy, Town Without Pity, 25 THE CHI. READER 14,18–20 (Jan.
11, 1996), available at http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/town-without-pity/Cont
ent?oid=8 89464 (discussing the case of Gregoary Banks, a suspect brutalized by
Cook County, Illinois police officers, who served six years behind bars before his
conviction was overturned); Balko, supra note 38 (citing the case of Eddie Triplett,
who served twelve years in prison after two New Orleans police officers wrongly
attributed cocaine found on another man to Triplett, testifying against him at trial
and, yet, remained on the force after their wrongdoing was uncovered).
123. See discussion supra Part II; Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 415–16 (1872)
(recognizing that unfair means are unjust to the “whole community.”).
124. See supra note 40.
125. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 261, 262–63 (2011) (noting that some “individual prosecutors handle more than
one thousand felony cases per year.”).
126. See, e.g., supra note 122.
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4. The Prosecutor May Pressure Defendants to Relinquish
Their Right to Appeal, Including the Right to Challenge
Defense Counsel’s Conduct For Ineffective Assistance
Judges have occasionally rejected a plea agreement conditioned
on a defendant’s waiver of her rights of appeal. 127 Courts that reject
plea waivers tend to do so because at the time of the plea, the
accused cannot know whether her sentence will rest on illegal or
unconstitutional grounds. 128 One judge reasoned:
[T]he defendant cannot know at the time he signs the plea
agreement and enters the plea whether the sentencing court
will find a basis for enhancing the defendant’s offense level
under the Sentencing Guidelines or whether the court will
depart upward from the applicable guideline range . . . .
Thus, it is only after the judge has sentenced the defendant
that the latter knows which rights he waived, and whether
those rights included the right to appeal a sentence in which
the court may have erroneously applied the Guidelines or
otherwise order an illegal or even unconstitutional
sentence.129
A trial judge in the District of Colorado rejected a plea with an
appeal waiver, arguing that the provision did not serve justice. 130
Judge John Kane concluded: “The interests of justice as I perceive
them are best served by permitting the calm and deliberate review
by the Court of Appeals . . . .” 131
Most courts, however, permit the prosecution to demand
appellate waivers from defendants during the plea negotiation
process. 132 Given that a plea deal is usually accompanied with

127. For example, in United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 438–39 (D.D.C.
1997), a federal district court judge rejected a plea conditioned on the defendant’s
waiver of appeal rights. The court viewed the waiver as inconsistent with the
requirements of Rule 11, F. R. CRIM. P., requiring pleas to be voluntary and knowing
relinquishments of rights. See also United States v. Rayno, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44
(D.D.C. 1997).
128. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 438–39.
129. Id. at 439.
130. United States v. Vanderwerff, Crim. No. 12-CR-00069, 2012 WL 2514933,
at * 6 (D. Colo. June 28, 2012).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Bedzhanyan, No. 11-5199, 2012 WL 2109249, at *1 (4th
Cir. 2012) (criminal defendant may in a valid plea agreement waive the right to
appeal); United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Arevalo, 628 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (plea waivers are “presumptively
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concessions from the government and naturally entails the
defendant foregoing important trial rights to earn those concessions,
there is arguably nothing inherently underhanded or immoral about
a plea waiver. But cases, of course, differ, and not all plea waivers
are alike. Some waive direct appeal rights while others surrender
considerably more.
Some prosecutors routinely insist that the accused sacrifice the
right to challenge his sentence in a subsequent habeas petition. 133
Courts are split on whether such waivers are effective. 134 Other
prosecutors demand that a defendant waive the right to challenge
the plea or sentence even if hindsight demonstrates that his lawyer
was ineffective in recommending or negotiating the plea deal. Both
types of waivers raise ethical issues. The Proposed Revision to the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice directed at plea bargains says a
prosecutor “should not routinely require plea waivers of postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial
misconduct, or destruction of evidence unknown to the defendant at
the time of the guilty plea.” 135 Efficiency is always served by such
waivers. But, in cases where defense counsel’s ineffectiveness
prevented the defense from understanding the terms of the plea,
from accurately evaluating his chances for acquittal at trial, or
encouraged an involuntary plea of guilty, the goals of procedural
fairness are not served. Thus, to the extent prosecutors seek blanket
waivers of such rights in every case, they are contributing to the
anti-justice nature of plea bargaining. Because of broad plea
waivers, in some unknown number of cases, a defendant who is not
guilty will plead guilty, and another defendant with viable and
legitimate constitutional arguments will lose the right to pursue
remedies for those rights.

enforceable.”). Even courts that regularly allow waivers recognize that some waivers
are unenforceable. Plea waivers may be invalid if they rest on impermissible grounds
like race; the plea itself is involuntary; the agreement itself is unlawful or includes
unlawful provisions; or the sentence resulting from the plea exceeds the statutory
maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2012); see
also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s
Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2031 (2010).
133. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
134. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2001)
(discussing split in authority and concluding that waiver of collateral attack rights is
valid).
135. See Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1150
(2011) (summarizing 2010 proposed revisions to Prosecution Function Standards).
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Given the risks to justice norms of plea waivers, the prosecutor’s
use of his extensive power to leverage such concessions is equally
problematic. One tool commonly used by the prosecution is to deny a
defendant a sentencing reduction for accepting responsibility for her
criminal acts and pleading guilty, if the defendant insists on keeping
her right to appeal. This sentencing benefit is colloquially called “the
third point” because it is described that way in the federal
sentencing guidelines.136 In United States v. Divens, the Fourth
Circuit held that a prosecutor acts illegally when denying the
defendant such a reduction simply because the defendant refuses to
waive her appeal rights. 137 In Divens, the defendant pled “straight
up,” 138 meaning without a plea contract. 139 The government argued
that the defendant’s refusal to sign a formal plea document, which
included language waiving her right to appeal, justified the
government’s refusal to move the court for a reduction in guideline
range 140 for sentencing purposes. 141 The trial court rejected this
argument. But the Seventh Circuit has held that the government is
permitted to withhold the additional sentencing discount point
authorized by the federal sentencing guidelines whenever a
defendant refuses to waive his appellate rights. 142 In United States
v. Deberry,143 the court assumed that the defendant “satisfied all the

136. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013).
137. United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
State could not refuse to move for a reduction in sentence based solely on the
defendant’s refusal to sign a plea agreement containing a waiver of his right to
appeal); see also U.S. v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43 (D.D.C. 1997).
138. This is a common term used by prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers to
refer to the act of pleading guilty to the indictment or other charging document
without a plea agreement.
139. See Divens, 650 F.3d at 344.
140. The applicable provision of the sentencing guidelines provides:
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. (b) If the defendant
qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level determined
prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon
motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by
timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the
government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease
the offense level by 1 additional level.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013).
141. See Divens, 650 F.3d at 345.
142. United States v. Deberry, 576 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2009).
143. Id.
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requirements [of the guidelines],” including “assist[ing] authorities
in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct” and
timely notifying the government of his intent to enter a plea, so as to
save the government from preparing for trial. 144 But “the
government refused to file a motion. The ground of its refusal was
the defendant’s refusal to agree to waive his right to appeal his
conviction or sentence.” 145 The court held that the government’s
refusal was reasonable, explaining that the provision in the
guidelines “confers an entitlement on the government.” 146
Those courts that find it unlawful for a prosecutor to exact an
appeal waiver in exchange for an additional acceptance of
responsibility sentencing benefit, are equally likely to prohibit
prosecutors from exercising their broad discretion to demand that a
defendant withdraw a motion to suppress or lose the acceptance of
responsibility benefit.
5. The Prosecutor May Wield Her Extensive Power and
Discretion in Ways That Result in Widely Different
Outcomes For Similarly-Situated Defendants
The plea bargaining system leads to wildly different sentences
for similar crimes and defendants because prosecutors exercise
discretion that rewards some defendants and neglects others who
are similarly situated. 147 In the federal system, and state systems
with sentencing guidelines designed to reduce racially biased and
other unwanted sentencing disparities, plea bargaining thwarts this
justice-enhancing goal of equality. The federal sentencing guidelines,
for example, were implemented nationwide in 1989 with a goal to
“provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of

144. Id. at 710; see also United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 38–39 (1st
Cir. 2008); United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2003).
145. Deberry, 576 F.3d at 710.
146. Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,
185 (1992), in which the Court held in the context of the government’s refusal to file
a motion to reduce the defendant’s sentence for providing substantial assistance to
the government in the prosecution of other crimes, that the government has the
power but not a duty to file a motion. The Court in Wade did, however, acknowledge
that the district court can review the government’s refusal to file for an
unconstitutional motive. Id. In dicta, the Court also stated that a defendant could
obtain relief if the prosecutor’s refusal is “not rationally related to any legitimate
Government end.” Id. at 186.
147. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1149–71 (discussing the myriad of mental
hoops a prosecutor has to jump through in assessing the appropriate plea bargain for
each defendant).
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sentencing by avoiding unwarranted disparity among offenders with
similar characteristics convicted of similar criminal conduct . . . .” 148
This evenhanded treatment of defendants, regardless of race,
gender, age, geographic location, socio-economic background and
financial status is lost when prosecutors are permitted to
manipulate sentencing outcomes through plea bargaining.
We should be especially concerned about the plea bargaining
context given the lack of judicial and public oversight during the
process, particularly because experience shows that some
prosecutors engage in misconduct even when the judge and jury are
watching. 149 There are too few “checks” on the prosecutor’s discretion
and power and little accountability. Neither a judge nor a jury
oversees the process, and defense counsel enjoys a limited ability to
respond to prosecutorial overreaching. Even if the defendant learns
that a prosecutor or the police have engaged in misconduct, she may
use the misconduct as a bargaining tool to obtain a better plea deal
without ever reporting the misconduct.150 Moreover, there are too
many competing demands on a prosecutor in the plea bargaining
context. Even if a prosecutor’s motives are pure, different results are
sure to follow because there is no clear mandate of what justice
requires when plea bargaining.151
B. Evaluating Brady Evidence Creates Ethical Slippage
In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
unambiguously that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 152 This legal duty is also
“incorporated into an explicit ethical duty upon government
attorneys.” 153 Thus, the law is plain and well established that a

148. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the
_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 80 (1935).
150. See Balko, supra note 38 (noting that “[t]here’s no question the overall
incidence of prosecutor misconduct is drastically masked by the high rate of plea
bargains. . . . In some cases, even plea bargains can come about because of
prosecutorial misconduct.”) (internal citation omitted).
151. Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1124.
152. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
153. Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors
Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 531 n.2 (2007) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT and ABA STANDARDS).
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prosecutor owes the accused a duty to produce evidence favorable to
her. 154 Yet, in too many cases to count, prosecutors have breached
their legal and ethical obligations by withholding “Brady”
information. 155 Professor Bennett Gershman 156 contends that
“[p]rosecutors have violated [Brady’s] principles so often that it
stands more as a landmark to prosecutorial indifference and abuse
than a hallmark of justice.” 157
Arguably, “violations of Brady are the most recurring and
pervasive of all constitutional procedural violations, with disastrous
consequences . . . .” 158 It is not surprising that prosecutors violate the
requirements of Brady with some regularity. 159 The duty to disclose
exculpatory information to opposing counsel requires prosecutors to
“straddle the fence between their two principal responsibilities: To
serve simultaneously as zealous advocates and neutral ‘ministers of
justice.’” 160 And “the odds of not getting caught are stacked so
heavily in the prosecutor’s favor.” 161 As many legal scholars have
suggested, the private nature of the review of a case significantly
increases the probability that a prosecutor will violate her Brady
obligations.162 Were prosecutors more immediately accountable to

154. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
155. See, e.g., supra note 16; infra notes 169–77; see also Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 339 (6th Cir. 1993) (attorneys within DOJ failed to disclose
to the court and to the accused “exculpatory information in their possession during
litigation culminating in extradition proceedings.”).
156. Bennett L. Gershman is a Professor of Law at Pace School of Law.
157. Gershman, supra note 153, at 531.
158. Id. at 533.
159. Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533,
1539 (2010) (“Brady violations take place with regularity.”).
160. Id. at 1535; see also Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 349–50 (noting a prosecutor’s
“obligation to work for justice rather than for a result that favors its attorneys’
preconceived ideas of what the outcome of legal proceedings should be.”).
161. Gershman, supra note 153, at 565.
162. See id. at 533 (criticizing the prosecutor’s ability to “sift, evaluate, and test
. . . information in private, [when] coupled with a defendant’s limited ability to
uncover evidence advantageous to his case.”); Medwed, supra note 159, at 1540 (“the
vast majority of suspect disclosure choices occur in the inner sanctuaries of
prosecutorial offices and never see the light of day.”) (citing Sara Gurwitch, When
Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation
to Provide Exculpatory Information to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 306–
07 (2010)); id. at 1541 (“When a prosecutor chooses not to disclose evidence, that
decision is seldom revealed to outsiders unless he later has a change of heart or it
somehow finds its way into defense hands.”) (citing Gershman, supra note 153, at
537); id. at 1548 (noting that Brady determinations “are not made in courtrooms or
during formal negotiations with defense counsel, but behind closed doors far from the
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the public—or at least the judiciary—when undertaking such a
review, the cost-benefit calculus would shift in favor of disclosure. As
it is, however, there is little incentive, especially in close cases, to
divulge information to the defense.163 Gershman argues that “it is
commonly believed that most Brady evidence never gets disclosed;
rather, it remains buried in drawers, boxes, and file cabinets in the
offices of the prosecutor, the police, and other law enforcement and
government agencies connected to the case.” 164 This distrust of the
process may be warranted, given that 97% of cases end in a plea of
guilty, and that cases involving guilty pleas are poor prospects for
successful Brady claims because the Supreme Court has absolved
prosecutors from a duty to produce at least most exculpatory
evidence in cases that end with a plea.165 And at a minimum, the
defendant must show that prosecutors failed to produce exculpatory
evidence “material” to the defense. 166 Once a plea is entered or a jury
finds a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a claim arguing
materiality 167 becomes nothing more than a hypothetical about how
the non-disclosed evidence might have impacted the outcome of the
case.168

prying eyes of defendants, judges, and state ethics boards.”); Robert P. Mosteller,
Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The
Critical Importance of Full Open-file Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 262
(2008) (arguing for open-file discovery to offset the “competitive process of the
adversary criminal trial” and its “inherent challenges to the critical but vague duty
‘to do justice.’”).
163. Remember, Brady does not require that all helpful information be disclosed,
only “material” and helpful information.
164. Gershman, supra note 153, at 536.
165. See supra Part III.A.2, discussing Ruiz. Despite the holding in Ruiz, a
prosecutor probably violates Brady by failing to produce evidence that renders a plea
involuntary. See Gershman, supra note 153, at 536 n.29.
166. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83,86-88 (1963).
167. Materiality in this context means “a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2012) (citing Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–70
(2009)). This was the primary issue in Cain, where prosecutors failed to disclose
interviews with a key eye witness that contradicted his trial testimony. Smith, 132 S.
Ct. at 628.
168. Medwed, supra note 159, at 1540 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court “has
cited the importance of the materiality prong [of Brady] . . . observing that the mere
withholding of exculpatory evidence does not rise to the level of a violation unless it
prejudices the defendant”); id. at 1543 (contending that the materiality standard
“gives prosecutors a wide berth to reach the outcome they want” and “is entirely
prospective and thus theoretical”).
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Despite the many hurdles making it difficult for defendants to
establish a violation of the prosecutor’s legal and ethical Brady
obligations, courts have found prosecutorial violations in numerous
cases. 169 For instance, in January 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
“reversed the conviction of a New Orleans man, saying prosecutors
there withheld important evidence that his lawyers could have used
in his defense.” 170 The information included notes from an interview
of the prosecution’s star eyewitness who identified the defendant at
trial as a killer of five people. 171 During the trial, the witness pointed
at the defendant and said: “I’ll never forget him.” 172 But in a
previous interview conducted only hours after the killings, the same
witness admitted “he could not describe the [multiple] intruders
except to say they were black men.” 173 Five days after that
interview, the same witness said “he had not seen the intruders’
faces and could not identify them.” 174 Prosecutors did not introduce
DNA, fingerprint, weapon or other physical evidence to buttress the
eyewitness testimony. 175 Perhaps most troubling about the case is
that in oral argument before the Supreme Court, an assistant
district attorney defended the prosecutor’s conduct, maintaining that
the prior interviews were not subject to disclosure under the Brady
decision.176 Justice Sotomayor showed her dissatisfaction with the
position, announcing, “It is disconcerting to me that when I asked
you the question directly, should this material have been turned
over, you gave an absolute no.” 177
In fact, the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office is somewhat
notorious for Brady violations. 178 In 2010, in an unrelated case, the
office conceded before the U.S. Supreme Court that it had violated
Brady during a prosecution for attempted armed robbery.179 As part
of the investigation, a crime technician took a fabric swatch from the
victim’s clothing, which was stained with the robber’s blood.180 The

169. Adam Liptak, High Court Reverses Conviction in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2012, at A14; see also Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 628–29 (2012).
170. Liptak, supra note 169.
171. Liptak, supra note 169.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuke a New Orleans Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2011, at A18.
177. Id.
178. See id.; Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. CT. 1350, 1355 (2011).
179. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355 (2011).
180. Id. at 1356.
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testing revealed that the robber’s blood type was B. 181 The
prosecutor did not know the defendant’s blood type, did not have it
tested, and did not disclose the test results to the defendant’s
lawyer.182 The defendant’s blood type was O, “proving that the blood
on the swatch was not his.” 183 In the meantime, the accused was
convicted, and the conviction led him to decline to testify in a
subsequent murder prosecution for which he was also convicted.184
No way exists to measure the number of run-of-the-mill cases in
which prosecutors have violated Brady,185 especially considering
that such flagrant breaches even occur in high profile cases, such as
the prosecution of former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens. 186 “An
extraordinary special investigation by a federal judge . . . concluded
that two Justice Department prosecutors intentionally hid evidence
in the case against Sen. Ted Stevens, one of the biggest political
corruption cases in recent history.” 187 Prosecutors claimed that the
Senator accepted “pricey renovations to his Alaska chalet” and failed
to disclose the renovations “on his congressional disclosure forms.” 188
Ironically, prosecutors engaged in their own unlawful disclosure
failures. They failed to produce “a handwritten note” from the
Senator asking for a bill for the renovations 189 and evidence that the
government’s star witness was allegedly involved in a sexual

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the prosecutor failed to disclose agreement to dismiss charges against key
witnesses); Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that
evidence of psychological reports in possession of prosecutor should have been
disclosed); see also Joaquin Sapien & Sergio Hernandez, Who Polices Prosecutors
Who Abuse Their Authority? Usually Nobody, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:30 AM),
available at http:// www.propublica.org/article/who-polices-prosecutors-who-abusetheir-authority-usual ly-nobody (original analysis by ProPublica showed Brady
violations “were the most common form of serious misconduct by city prosecutors,
who failed to meet these standards in more than half of the 30 cases reversed by
state or federal courts based on misconduct.”).
186. See Carrie Johnson, Report: Prosecutors Hid Evidence in Ted Stevens Case,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 15, 2012, 5:56 p.m.), available at http://ww.npr.
org/2012/03/15/148687717/report-prosecutors-hid-evidence-in-ted-stevens-case.
187. Id.; see also Mosteller, supra note 162, at 257 (discussing “the disciplinary
charges brought by the North Carolina State Bar against Nifong for failure to
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence . . .”).
188. Johnson, supra note 186.
189. Id.
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relationship with a fifteen-year-old girl, whom he asked to lie under
oath about the relationship. 190
Indeed, the injustices that result from prosecutors’ breaches of
their Brady obligations are legendary. Such abuses are particularly
troubling because they happen relatively often; they have the
potential for results that undermine goals of the justice system—
such as deterrence and retribution, 191 and prosecutorial misconduct
undermines public confidence in the criminal process, especially
given that prosecutors who violate Brady are rarely disciplined. 192 A
murder case from New York illustrates this injustice. 193 In 1994, a
young man was shot and near death when police found him. 194 The
gunshot victim identified the shooter as two-time felon Tony
Bennett.195 Bennett “was eventually captured, convicted of murder,
and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.” 196 Bennett’s sentence
was later overturned because the prosecutor on his case violated
Brady by “withholding critical evidence from Bennett’s attorney.” 197
As a result, Bennett was released after thirteen years in prison. 198
After his release, Bennett talked openly, admitting to killing his
victim and bragging about his early release. 199 In the meantime, the
prosecutor continued in his job, reportedly “manipulat[ing] evidence
in another case” and “l[ying] to a trial judge about the whereabouts
of a key defense witness.” 200

190. Id.
191. See Mosteller, supra note 162, at 263 (discussing the “extraordinary
exculpatory evidence” withheld by prosecutors in the murder trial of Alan Gell who
was sentenced to death).
192. See id. at 261 (examining three cases, including the Duke Lacrosse case as
well as two murder cases, in which prosecutors in North Carolina withheld
exculpatory information, also noting that between 1998 and 2008 “ten death penalty
cases in North Carolina [were] reversed after trial because of prosecution failures to
provide Brady information.”); Sapien & Hernandez supra note 185 (finding that
“[b]etween 2008 and 2009, just 1 percent of the roughly 91,000 complaints . . .
resulted in public sanctions”).
193. Sapien & Hernandez, supra note 185.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (ProPublica reports citing other, similar Brady violations in New York,
including the case of Jabbar Collins, who served a fifteen year prison sentence for
murder after a senior Brooklyn prosecutor withheld “critical evidence during trial”
and a case in which a Manhattan prosecutor withheld evidence resulting in men
serving 36 years in prison). Id.
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Because of the many cases in which prosecutors have violated
their Brady obligations, legal scholars have proposed a range of
changes to the system to encourage stricter compliance, including
internal, formal review committees, 201 open file discovery,202 and
additional judicial participation in Brady decisions. 203
C. Withholding FISA Evidence Violates the Duty of Justice
In December 2012, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, spoke before Congress about
continuing threats of domestic terrorism. 204 In her speech, she
referenced a prosecution in Fort Lauderdale, Florida and one in
Chicago, Illinois.205 The mention of these cases led criminal defense
lawyers in them to ask the prosecution to disclose information
derived from FISA that played a part in the prosecutions. 206
Prosecutors refused to produce the information. 207 They contended
that they were obligated to disclose use of the FISA wiretap program
“only if [the government] introduced a recorded phone call or
intercepted e-mail gathered directly from the program[.]” 208 In
refusing to produce the information, DOJ lawyers and “a policy
advisory committee of senior United States attorneys focused on
operational worries.” 209 According to these groups, “Disclosure risked
alerting foreign targets that their communications were being
monitored, so intelligence agencies might become reluctant to share
information with law enforcement officials that could become a
problem in a later trial.” 210
The Solicitor General of the United States, Donald B. Verrilli,
Jr., ultimately disagreed, noting that “withholding disclosure from

201. Medwed, supra note 159, at 1553.
202. Gershman, supra note 153, at 542.
203. Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
391, 427–28 (1984).
204. See 158 CONG. REC. S8393 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2012); see also Savage, supra
note 21.
205. See Savage, supra note 21.
206. Id.; Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, Administration Says
Mining of Data Is Crucial to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, at A1 (“In both
[the Florida and Chicago] cases, defense lawyers have cited Ms. Feinstein’s
statement and demanded to know whether any evidence against their clients was
swept up under the 2008 surveillance law that undergirds Prism.”).
207. Savage, supra note 21.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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defendants could not be justified legally[.]” 211 Even a quick review of
the disclosure provision in FISA supports the Solicitor General. The
pertinent provision says:
Whenever the Government intends to enter into evidence or
otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, against an aggrieved person, any information
obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that
aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this
subchapter, the Government shall, prior to the trial, hearing,
or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort
to so disclose or so use that information or submit it in
evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the court or other
authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used
that the Government intends to so disclose or so use such
information. 212
Rather than accept the plain meaning of the statute or the
Solicitor General’s legal position, prosecutors in both the Florida and
Chicago cases continued to deny any duty to disclose evidence
derived from the FISA surveillance in these criminal prosecutions. 213
In Florida, prosecutors contradicted the Solicitor General’s position,
declaring in a court filing that such notification to a defendant
“would be ‘unwarranted and unprecedented.’” 214 Then, in both the
Florida and Chicago cases, prosecutors announced that “they did not

211. Id. (indicating that during an internal DOJ debate, the Solicitor General
contended that “there was no legal basis for a previous practice of not disclosing links
to such surveillance”); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154
(2013) (in which the Solicitor General argued that the complainants lacked standing
to complain about the government’s wiretapping surveillance program, but that
criminal defendants who are aggrieved by the program would have standing to
challenge the surveillance); Sari Horwitz, Justice is Reviewing Criminal Cases That
Used Surveillance Evidence Gathered Under FISA, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-reviewing-criminalcases-that-used-evidence-gathered-under-fisa-act/2013/11/15/0aea6420-4e0d-11e3-98
90-a1e0997fb0c0_story.html.
212. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2010). There is a comparable provision for use of such
information by “any State or political subdivision thereof.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(d)
(2010).
213. Barrett, supra note 5 (indicating that federal prosecutors in a terror
prosecution in Chicago and in the Florida terrorism case claimed they “had no
obligation to notify a defendant if the secret surveillance program had helped catch
him”).
214. Id.
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intend to use any evidence derived from surveillance of the
defendants under the 2008 law.” 215 Prosecutors, likewise, failed to
turn over the information to the court for in camera, ex parte review,
even though such review is expressly provided for by the FISA
statute for cases in which disclosure risks harming national
security. 216 But “eventually, Verrilli[‘s position on disclosure] won
out.” 217 In July 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice first formally
acknowledged “in a terrorism prosecution that it needs to tell
defendants when sweeping government surveillance is used to build
a criminal case against them.” 218 In October 2013, federal
prosecutors notified defendant Jamshid Muhtorov, charged in
Colorado with providing material aid to a terrorist organization, that

215. Savage, supra note 21. See also Barrett, supra note 5 (stating that the
federal government agreed that “generally it should provide . . . a notice to
defendants” but then excused any production in the specific case, noting that
“prosecutors don’t plan to introduce any evidence based on the surveillance
program”); Michael Tarm, Lawyer for Terror Suspects Say Government Doesn’t Want
Challenge to Surveillance, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 21, 2013, http://www.foxnews
.com/politics/2013/06/21/lawyers-for-chicago-terror-suspect-say-government-doesntwant-challenge-to/ (government refuses to confirm or deny whether they used farreaching surveillance evidence in their investigation of Daoud).
216. The applicable provision says:
Whenever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (c) or
(d) of this section, or whenever a motion is made pursuant to subsection (e)
of this section, or whenever any motion or request is made by an aggrieved
person . . . relating to electronic surveillance or to discover, obtain, or
suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic
surveillance under this chapter, the United States district court . . .
shall . . . if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that
disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the
United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and
such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to
determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully
authorized and conducted.
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2010).
217. Horwitz, supra note 211; see also Barrett, supra note 5 (acknowledging “for
the first time [in July, 2013] in a terrorism prosecution that [the government] needs
to tell defendants when sweeping government surveillance is used to build a criminal
case against them” marking a “change in legal direction . . . bring[ing] government
prosecutors in line with statements Solicitor General Donald Verrilli made to the
Supreme Court [in 2012].”).
218. Barrett, supra note 5.
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they intended to use FISA surveillance information in his case. 219
Prosecutors are still refusing to make disclosures in Chicago,
although the defense claims “there [is] circumstantial evidence that
his client, Adel Daoud, 19, came to the government’s attention by
activities that were swept up in surveillance targeted at overseas
Web sites.” 220 Further, while U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has
indicated that the DOJ “is conducting a comprehensive review of all
criminal cases in which the government has [previously] used
evidence gathered through its warrantless surveillance program[,]”
it remains uncertain, at best, whether prosecutors will undertake
the review with any real intention of complying with the law. 221
According to Holder, DOJ lawyers “will be examining cases that
are in a variety of stages, and . . . where appropriate, providing
defendants with information that they should have so they can make
their own determinations about how they want to react to it.” 222
Some examinations may “involve cases in which defendants have
already been convicted and are in prison.” 223 That is the case, for
instance, in Portland, Oregon, where attorneys for a twenty-two year
old man, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, who was convicted in 2013 of
attempted terrorism, are seeking a new trial because Mohamud “was
not informed that the government used the warrantless program in
bringing its case the first time.” 224 He was told in November 2013
that “the FBI used evidence obtained through the NSA’s use of
intercepts” under FISA. 225 His lawyers contend that his case “‘raises
a wide range of serious issues regarding suppression of unlawfully or
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, dismissal or other sanctions
based on the government’s intentional violation of governing rules,
and, at least, a new trial based on new evidence of governmental
overreaching.’” 226
More significantly, it is highly unlikely that the Solicitor
General, the Department of Justice, or the prosecutor in any
criminal matter would have acknowledged use of the FISA
surveillance program, let alone disclosed evidence derived from the
program, had former NSA contractor Edward Snowden not exposed
the federal government’s “widespread collection of Internet and

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Horwitz, supra note 211.
Schmitt, Sanger & Savage, supra note 206.
Horwitz, supra note 211.
Id.
Id.
Nakashima, supra note 75.
Id.
Id. (citing Mohamud’s lawyer, Stephen R. Sady).
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phone records” of Americans. 227 While DOJ has publically
announced its support for full compliance with FISA’s disclosure
provisions, strong indicators remain that prosecutors will continue to
resist such disclosures. For example, in the Chicago case against
teenage defendant Adel Daoud, defense lawyers have asked the trial
court to step in and “force prosecutors to reveal whether the
investigation was sparked by a massive government surveillance
program” 228 because as of January 2014, prosecutors continued to
deny any obligation to provide the information voluntarily. 229 The
assistant U.S. attorney handling the prosecution told the judge that
“prosecutors ha[d] complied with all discovery rules” and that there
“is no reason to deviate from decades of precedent.” 230
IV. PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS—LESSONS, WARNINGS, AND GUIDANCE
FOR HANDLING FISA EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Although an unethical prosecutor with malevolent intentions can
misbehave in any setting and contribute to a wrongful conviction or
cover up unlawful conduct by police or other prosecutors, some
contexts are more likely than others to tempt prosecutors to breach
their ethical duty of justice. The process of plea bargaining and the
review of case files for exculpatory evidence are two contexts in
which seemingly well-intentioned prosecutors have repeatedly
slipped below the ethical floor. 231 Recent events in which prosecutors
have consistently refused to comply with their statutory obligations
of disclosure under FISA demonstrate a third, similar context. The
common theme among the three is the lack of accountability for
prosecutors to juries, judges, or the public. Prosecutors regularly fail
to meet the ethical norm when removed from the traditional,
adversarial courtroom setting, unless there is an equivalent, outside
influence, such as a grand jury, made up of ordinary citizens. This
Part of the Article reviews the inherent obstacles for justice in the
plea and Brady contexts with an eye toward developing lessons for
FISA cases.

227. Barrett, supra note 5.
228. Meisner, supra note 6.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355 (2011); Liptak, supra
note 169; Sapien & Hernandez, supra note 185.
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A. The Plea Bargaining and Brady Contexts Demand Judicial or
Other External Oversight of Prosecutorial Decision Making
Plea bargaining and the review of files for Brady materials
contrast starkly with situations in which prosecutors present
testimony and evidence before a citizen grand jury, try a case before
a petit jury, or present arguments in the presence of competent
opposing counsel. Prosecutors have, of course, committed
prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury 232 and trial and hearing
settings also, 233 but in those contexts, there is a robust deterrent—
immediate public and judicial scrutiny—that limits the likelihood
and reach of such prosecutorial misconduct. Grand jurors are free to
inquire of the prosecutor about questionable testimony 234 and ask
that other evidence be presented. 235 The grand jury also maintains
the power to return a “no bill” if the group remains unconvinced by
the propriety of the prosecution or one or more counts in an
indictment.236 Likewise, at trial, defense counsel stands ready to
raise doubts about any perceived gaps or irregularities in the
evidence, the prosecutor’s questioning of witnesses, or any arguably
improper arguments to the jury.237 Should the prosecutor commit an
infraction of the legal or ethical rules, the trial judge will instruct
the jury to disregard the offensive evidence or statement. 238

232. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 555 (1962) (court found
prosecutor’s treatment of a witness during interrogation in a grand jury proceeding,
namely threats of prosecution for perjury, to be inappropriate but not an
“irregularity of constitutional proportions . . .”); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d
807, 814, 818 (3rd Cir. 1979) (prosecutor’s graphic and misleading references to
defendant’s violent conduct and association with organized crime violated ABA
Standard 3.5(b), Relations with Grand Jury).
233. See United States v. Santos-Rivera, 726 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2013)
(misconduct in closing argument); Lisa H. Wallach, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the
Grand Jury: Dismissal of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory Power, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 129–35 (1987) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct in the
grand jury).
234. Susan W. Brenny, Lori E. Shaw, & Gregory G. Lockhart, FEDERAL GRAND
JURY: A GUIDE to LAW and PRACTICE § 6:3 (Thomson/West ed., 2d ed. 2006).
235. Administratvie Office of the United State Courts, Handbook for Federal
Grand Jurors, available at htpp://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/jury/docs/federalgrand.pdf.
236. See F. R. CRIM. P. R. 6(f) (requiring at least twelve grand jurors to concur
before an indictment may be returned); see also Charles A. Wright & Andrew D.
Leipold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 111, at 446, 448 (Thomson/West
ed., 4th ed. 2008).
237. See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1993).
238. See Keller v. Bagley, 81 Fed App’x 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2003) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the defense counsel’s failure to object and the court’s failure to
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Furthermore, if the error is egregious, on direct review, the appellate
court will order a new trial or overturn the defendant’s conviction. 239
By comparison to the grand jury, public hearings, and trial
settings, prosecutorial overreaching is easily concealed during plea
bargaining, and misconduct is equally difficult to detect when
prosecutors withhold exculpatory evidence as part of the review of
the government’s investigation files as required by the decision in
Brady v. Maryland.240 Any prosecutorial transgression is typically
uncovered years after a defendant’s conviction becomes final 241—if
ever—through a post-conviction proceeding, such as habeas
corpus.242 At that late date, after guilt has already been determined,
courts possess little motivation to agree that there was prosecutorial
wrongdoing. After all, such conduct may not have infected the
outcome of the case. Perhaps the defendant is, in fact, guilty of the
crimes charged. At the same time, identifying and publicizing
prosecutorial misconduct casts a cloud over the integrity of that case,
and to some extent, the judicial system itself, 243 especially if the
misconduct went undetected for an extended period.
Similarly, overreaching during the plea negotiation process is
hidden by the fact that most guilty plea agreements require the
defendant to waive all arguments of prosecutorial overreaching (or
any other flaw) during the plea bargaining process, including rights
to appeal. 244 Thus, the process in which prosecutors currently
conduct plea negotiations and perform the review of files for Brady
materials tends to maximize efficiency and cost savings rather than
prosecutorial integrity and accurate outcomes. 245 The system
promotes early plea deals in which prosecutors offer relatively minor
concessions in exchange for a defendant’s relinquishment of multiple
rights and for other significant time and resource benefits to the

instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s incorrect statements of the law).
239. United States v. Mendoza, 522 F.3d 482, 495–96 (5th Cir. 2008).
240. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 186; Sapien & Hernandez, supra note 185.
241. See Sapien & Hernandez, supra note 185 (citing the case of Tony Bennet,
who served thirteen years in prison before his conviction was overturned because of a
Brady violation).
242. See discussion supra Part III.B.
243. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005
BYU L. REV. 53, 63 (2005) (pointing to five death sentences that were overturned
after North Carolina’s open-files process for death row prisoners’ habeas corpus
actions uncovered prosecutorial misconduct).
244. See discussion supra Part III.A.; see also Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1178–
79.
245. Yaroshevsky, supra note 59, at 59.
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prosecutor. 246 For example, plea deals absolve the government from
producing discovery, including exculpatory evidence, some of which
may cast doubt on the strength of the government’s case; other
Brady evidence may expose embarrassing or illegal conduct by
government investigators. 247 A plea deal also ensures that
defendants will not pursue time-consuming and costly appeals after
conviction. 248 Likewise, the system allows a single prosecutor to
decide, without input from the defense or some other neutral party,
which, if any, evidence in the possession of the government is
material and favorable to the defense. 249 No appellate or other
interlocutory review of the prosecutor’s decisions occur about
whether the government’s files contain evidence that must be
disclosed to the defense to ensure compliance with the prosecutor’s
constitutional, due process obligations.
The custom of allowing prosecutors to make critical decisions
behind closed doors, coupled with the current prosecutorial
environment favoring efficacy over other equally or more important
aims of justice, undermines the milieu in which prosecutors can be
expected to accomplish optimum results in these contexts. Before
justice can be maximized, the incentive structure for prosecutors
must be altered. There are a number of potential changes that could
be adopted to shift that structure. Of course, any change to the
current system should reflect the targeted outcome. For instance, if
the primary goal is to guard against pressuring innocent defendants
to plead guilty, or the goal is to permit defendants to retain the right
to object to a disproportionate sentence following a plea of guilty,
judges could exercise more control over the plea bargaining process.
Judges could refuse to accept any plea deal that requires too many
concessions by the accused. Such control would necessarily involve
closer scrutiny of any plea provision in which a defendant waives his
rights to appeal, especially a waiver of a right to seek habeas review
for an unexpected sentence or to raise claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel during the bargaining process. A goal of reducing the
number of wrongful convictions would also warrant a new rule
requiring prosecutors to produce exculpatory evidence to the defense
before any plea of guilty is entered, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ruiz. 250 Additionally, judges or legislatures could

246. Zacharias, supra note 30, at 1124–26.
247. Lain, supra note 98, at 24–25; id. at 34–35.
248. See discussion supra Part III.A.4.
249. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (noting that a prosecutor alone
can know what is undisclosed and must be assigned the responsibility of determining
the effect of evidence and making disclosure when necessary).
250. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430961

744

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:699

impose a requirement that prosecutors adopt an “open file” discovery
policy. 251 Such a change would encourage the production of Brady
material and promote a sense of transparency of process, which
would, correspondingly, reduce any suspicion on the part of the
accused or the public that the prosecution withheld relevant and
helpful information from the defense. In pursuit of these goals,
judges could also intensify the colloquy that precedes the entry of a
guilty plea. 252 Normally the colloquy requires the defendant to
answer a number of questions to ensure that the plea is voluntary
and knowing.253 But this discussion between the judge and litigants
could expand to include a number of questions directed to the
prosecutor. If, for example, “doing justice” includes the desire to
expose and reduce incidents of wrongdoing by law enforcement,
prosecutors could be asked in court and on the record—either during
an arraignment, a pretrial hearing, or during the plea colloquy—to
articulate whether the government is aware of any constitutional or
statutory violations that occurred during the investigation. If “doing
justice” entails full compliance with discovery and the production of
Brady evidence, the judge could ask the prosecutor to identify the
specific pieces of evidence produced and the efforts made to locate
other responsive evidence. Whatever the specific goal, oversight from
outside influences—competent opposing counsel, judges, members of
the press and public, or a combination—will play a critical role.

251. See Mosteller, supra note 162, at 262.
252. There is precedent for allowing trial judges extensive power over pleas. See
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (explaining that there is no right to
plead guilty); United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging trial judges’ broad power over pleas); United States v. Carrigan, 778
F.2d 1454, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (court rejected proposed plea deal where the
defendant corporation would plead guilty upon the condition that the charges against
the defendant individual would be dropped. The court allowed the parties an
additional week to work out a plea agreement, after warning the parties that the
court was wary of any plea agreement that did not “involve some accountability of
some guilty individual.”).
253. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring the trial judge to “address the
defendant personally in open court” before accepting a plea and engaging in a
colloquy to ensure the plea is voluntary and that the defendant understands the
rights he is relinquishing).
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B. The Concept of Role Morality Explains Why Prosecutors Are
Destined to Frustrate Justice without Some External Oversight of
Their Decision Making
In terms of accomplishing just results, the private nature of
prosecutorial decision making is only part of the anti-justice
calculus. The many competing pressures on prosecutors, including
sometimes intense pressure from immediate supervisors to win,
while cutting costs and corners, threatens an already precarious
environment for expecting even-handed treatment of defendants and
cases. The literature on role morality is instructive here. 254 The
concept of role morality underscores the need for adversarial judicial
proceedings or some equivalent check on prosecutors’ power and
responsibility. “Role morality often involves people acting in ways
that they would view as clearly unethical if they were acting on their
own behalf, but because they are acting on behalf of their employer
or a client, they view their actions as permissible.” 255 The basic
theory underlying role morality is that “we wear two ‘moral hats’—
one for work and one for everywhere else.” 256
Role morality has particular applicability to professionals, like
prosecutors, “because of their special status”; “[they] may find
themselves morally at odds with their best moral judgments.” 257 The
concept of role morality explains the tension Sam Dalton, a living
criminal defense icon, 258 reportedly observed in young prosecutors
shortly after the Supreme Court announced the decision in Brady v.
Maryland. Dalton says that following Brady, “younger prosecutors
tried to take it seriously, and would try to comply, but there was still
a community standard to evade disclosure. So they’d actually hide it
from their bosses when they’d turn over favorable evidence to us.” 259
Although role morality is merely a theory to explain behavior, for
prosecutors, divergent moral and professional pressures can feel
very real. For example, a prosecutor’s office may have a policy

254. Robert A. Prentice, Role Morality, ETHICS UNWRAPPED (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/video/role-morality/; see also Kevin Gibson,
Contrasting Role Morality and Professional Morality: Implications for Practice, 20 J.
OF APPLIED PHIL., no. 1, 17 (2003) (“The notion of role morality suggests individuals
may adopt a different morality depending on the roles they undertake.”).
255. Prentice, supra note 254.
256. Gibson, supra note 254, at 17.
257. Id. (giving as an example an attorney who “feel[s] compelled to vigorously
cross-examine a fragile witness for the opposing side”).
258. Mr. Dalton is a lawyer in New Orleans, Louisiana, where he has practiced
for sixty years. See Balko, supra note 38.
259. See id.
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demanding that prosecutors obtain a written plea agreement,
including a waiver of appellate rights (both direct appeals and
habeas corpus review), before the prosecutor agrees to a sentence
concession, such as a shorter sentence for the accused’s willingness
to accept responsibility for his role in the crime. Another office may
enact a policy requiring prosecutors to exact a dismissal of all
motions to suppress before agreeing to a plea. Still others may
implement strict policies favoring the disclosure of minimal
discovery—including potentially exculpatory evidence. Indeed, the
policies of the Department of Justice regarding charging and
sentencing have varied with each new attorney general.260 And
elections commonly result in a different district attorney or new
attorney general, and those new officers often adopt policies different
from their predecessors. 261
Because of the divergent pressures on prosecutors, they confront
“multi-layered, conflicting and crosscutting demands of differing
moralities — the individual’s own values, those imposed by the
employer, and the constraints of professional codes.” 262 These multilayered demands are even more complicated by the fact that they
change over time. As discussed above, one attorney general may
demand that every prosecutor charge the most readily provable
offense and concede nothing upon the defendant’s agreement to
plead guilty. 263 Another attorney general may emphasize
individualized determinations based on the unique circumstances of
a case.264 Whatever the demands of the supervisory prosecutors in
the office, the prosecutor handling the case experiences all of these
pressures without counter-balancing oversight and influence from
judge, jury, the public, or a competent adversary. Thus, the strongest
voice in the calculus will be that of the prosecutor’s employer.
Typically the prosecutor’s employer will mean her immediate
supervisor but may include the district attorney, the U.S. Attorney
or, in the federal system, the U.S. Attorney General. Sometimes
these supervisory voices are intimately involved in individual cases.
Often they are not; rather, they speak to individual prosecutors by
issuing broad policy guidance.
From the perspective of the prosecutor’s employer, it is
reasonable to encourage efficiency in the way of maximizing
convictions and minimizing the costs of extended trials, multiple
hearings, and avoiding extended litigation—such as appeals and

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Id.
Gibson, supra note 254, at 24.
Ashcroft Memo, supra note 15.
Holder Memo, supra note 15.
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claims of ineffective assistance of defense counsel—following
conviction. At a macro level, maximizing these efficiencies may
maximize just outcomes. Certainly increasing the number of
convictions in a prosecutor’s office, while decreasing the man-hours
and money spent to achieve that higher conviction rate, is defensible
as a morally acceptable, if not preferable, outcome. But requiring a
prosecutor to maximize efficiency in every case oversimplifies the
prosecutor’s ethical duty. It also ignores the need for individualized
justice determinations. The purest example of the flaw in
maximizing efficiency is the case of an innocent defendant who
pleads guilty and waives extensive rights (to file motions to suppress
and appeal, for instance) in exchange for the prosecutor agreeing to
leniency in charging or sentencing. While the prosecutor will have
obtained a conviction and saved man-hours and money in doing so,
the outcome will be indisputably unjust. This example demonstrates
that a prosecutor assigned to a case should always be encouraged to
thoroughly evaluate the strength of the evidence, consider whether
there is competing, exculpatory evidence, weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, decide whether the investigation was conducted in
compliance with the Constitution and statutory requirements, reflect
upon the defendant’s willingness to accept responsibility for her
crimes, decide whether the defendant has an ability to assist the
government in other criminal cases, review the defendant’s criminal
history, consider the impact of the crime on victims, and evaluate a
myriad of other factors. Prosecutors are effectively prevented from
“doing justice” when they are required to maximize bureaucratic
goals at the expense of more important interests of the justice
system. But they may face intense pressure as employees to follow
the directives of their supervisory attorneys and comply with the
office culture, which emphasizes efficiency.
This backdrop explains why some scholars have criticized plea
bargaining as unfair, and others have argued for significant
modifications to the manner in which prosecutors conduct case
reviews for exculpatory Brady information. Prosecutors regularly
confront “conflicting and crosscutting demands” 265 to wield their
extensive power in ways that benefit their employers, comply with
their own moral standards, recognize the liberty interests of the
accused, and respond to the needs of victims and other members of
the public. Prosecutors experience these pressures as they make
important decisions about how hard to bargain and how much
evidence to share with the accused during discovery. These
pressures, combined with the fact that prosecutors make such

265.

Gibson, supra note 254, at 24.
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decisions in substantial seclusion, create an environment in which
the ideal of justice is improbable. Indeed, it is impossible for a single
prosecutor to serve all of the professional demands placed on her at
any given time. These demands include: following departmental
rules, conforming to the distinctive office culture, winning
convictions, and reducing the number of pending cases and motions,
while simultaneously reaching results that are equitable and that
align with practices of other prosecutors within the same office and
with results reached in other offices across the state, region, and
country. While prosecutors know that they are obligated to “do
justice,” they receive “protean” 266 messages about what that
responsibility requires in a given case.
C. There Are Lessons from Plea Bargaining and Brady for
Prosecutors Making Decisions about FISA Evidence
There are valuable lessons from the plea bargaining and Brady
contexts for prosecutors assigned to criminal cases built upon
evidence derived from covertly acquired electronic surveillance.
These lessons extend to cases affecting national security, including
cases alleging terrorism. The questionable policies adopted by
prosecutors for plea bargaining and the many mistakes, if not
outright wrongdoing, committed by prosecutors when producing
exculpatory information material to the defense, offer guidance for
prosecutors who hope to avoid ethical pitfalls in cases implicating
FISA, which requires that prosecutors give notice to targets “of . . .
electronic surveillance.”267 As the cases discussed in Part III
demonstrate, prosecutors are uniquely positioned to determine
whether a case contains evidence obtained under the authority of
FISA. Neither defense counsel nor the judge presiding over a case
will have reason to know of such evidence, unless the prosecutor
discloses its existence. As recent events have already confirmed,
there will be at least mild, if not intense, pressure on prosecutors
from supervisors or others, such as national security lawyers within
DOJ, to withhold relevant and responsive information. Indeed, in
the past year, prosecutors have refused to produce evidence that
FISA requires to be disclosed, even after the Solicitor General
publically declared that no legally supportable basis exists on which
to withhold the information. 268

266. See Green, supra note 14, at 608 (describing the duty of justice as “protean
as well as vague”).
267. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2010).
268. See Savage, supra note 21, at A3.
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The time for prosecutors to set and follow a consistent policy of
disclosure that complies strictly with the Congressional mandate
spelled out in FISA is now. Only recently has the public discovered
that the government has been acquiring information about their
phone calls and emails, raising doubts about its intrusion on citizen
privacy and the government’s credibility in failing to divulge the
existence, let alone details, of the surveillance program. 269 On the
heels of Edward Snowden’s exposure of these wide-reaching
investigative efforts, criminal defense lawyers and the American
people learned that some of this covertly acquired information is
being used to build criminal cases. Many of the cases involve
allegations of terrorism. In July 2013, prosecutors, for the first time,
acknowledged that such evidence was part of the investigation
leading to the prosecution of two brothers for alleged terrorism. 270
Apparently, there are a number of other undisclosed, closed cases
that were also developed with FISA evidence. 271 In at least some of
those cases, prosecutors seemingly failed altogether to comply with
their legal obligations as set out in FISA. Presumably, national
security lawyers within DOJ (as they did in response to the Solicitor
General’s directive to give notice) unilaterally decided that the
interests of justice absolved them from compliance. A short time ago,
the U.S. Attorney General ordered a review of those closed cases.272
A prosecutor whose ethical duty requires her to “seek justice”
cannot legitimately claim to meet that goal unless she complies with
the legal minimums in the FISA (or any other) statute. Even
assuming that cases involving FISA investigations will unearth
evidence that implicates issues of national security and that
prosecutors worry that disclosure of evidence will jeopardize lives or
other important national interests, prosecutors can fully meet their
legal and ethical obligations by producing the evidence ex parte, in
camera, as Section 1806(f) of the FISA statute expressly permits. 273
Because FISA matters have only recently attracted public
attention in criminal cases, prosecutors can help regain the public’s
confidence by immediately adopting and following a policy favoring
disclosure and, when disclosure is impractical, transparency. A
policy that shifts the decision making from the backroom of the
prosecutor’s office to the courtroom will also avoid incentives for
prosecutors to adopt strategies that overreach or those that smack of
gamesmanship in which prosecutors adopt a win-at-all-costs

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See Barrett, supra note 5, at A1.
Id.
See id. at A1–A2; see also discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
50 U.S.C. § 1806 (f) (2010).
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mentality, strategies that have surfaced in the plea bargaining and
Brady contexts. Submitting close cases to a neutral decision maker,
who will review the surveillance evidence and decide whether and
what information should be disclosed, will also create an incentive
structure that favors fair play and enhances the likelihood that
justice will be accomplished. As plea bargaining and Brady
violations have established, prosecutors experience a greater ability
to do justice when exposed to external, justice-enhancing influences
beyond supervisory prosecutors.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former contractor for the U.S.
National Security Agency, leaked classified information revealing a
government-operated surveillance program known as PRISM. 274 As
part of PRISM, the federal government collects extensive amounts of
data from phone companies and email accounts. 275 It also monitors
phone conversations. 276 In the wake of these revelations, the U.S.
Solicitor General in February 2013 told the Supreme Court that
criminal defendants in individual cases could challenge wiretapping
and other covert surveillance operations, such as PRISM. 277 He
explained that FISA requires prosecutors to inform defendants
affected by evidence derived from FISA surveillance. 278 Despite
FISA’s unambiguous requirement of disclosure and the Solicitor
General’s assurances, prosecutors continued to withhold surveillance
evidence in criminal cases. 279 In doing so, these prosecutors
disregarded both federal law and their ethical duty to “seek justice.”
But the violations of law and ethics were predictable and, arguably,
inevitable. As the many questionable policies pursued by prosecutors
in the plea bargaining context and the long trail of Brady abuses by
prosecutors has already established, it is unrealistic to expect
prosecutors to serve the many ideals of justice, while making
decisions in seclusion. Prosecutors are incapable of accomplishing
even-handed results when supervisory prosecutors are their only
meaningful influences. At a minimum, justice demands judicial
proceedings or public oversight.

274. Judy Woodruff, Looking Back at the Snowden Leaks That Sparked U.S.
Surveillance Revelations, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 26, 2013), available at www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/government_programs-july-dec13-surveillance1_12-26/.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013).
278. Id.
279. See Barrett, supra note 5.
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